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policy effectiveness in the face of a global recession 
ENEPRI Working Paper No. 55/August 2009 
Patrick Van Brusselen
* 
Abstract 
Since August 2007, the world economy has fallen into recession and been confronted by a 
severe financial crisis. In the midst of this global recession, what hope can we place in the fiscal 
stimulus plans that have been announced? This Working Paper evaluates whether the measures 
implemented in the euro area and the US will be adequate responses. It indicates that while 
these measures will undoubtedly prove useful in limiting the scale and duration of the downturn, 
they will not be sufficient by themselves to prevent a lengthy recession followed by a tepid 
recovery. The paper argues that to maximise the effectiveness of the stimulus plans, they should 
be accompanied by accommodative monetary policy. Furthermore, to accelerate and underpin a 
recovery in global economic activity, fiscal and monetary policies should also be supplemented 
by measures aimed at re-establishing banking and financial sectors that function properly. 
 
                                                      
* Patrick Van Brusselen is an economist at the Belgian Federal Planning Bureau. He is in charge of the 
work on the Bureau's world macroeconometric model NIME and is the author of the Bureau's regular 
publication, The NIME Outlook for the World Economy.  
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Fiscal Stabilisation Plans 
and the Outlook for the World Economy 
Do counter-cyclical fiscal measures offer any hope of 
recovery for the world economy? An evaluation of fiscal 
policy effectiveness in the face of a global recession 
ENEPRI Working Paper No. 55/August 2009 
Patrick Van Brusselen 
he topic of counter-cyclical fiscal policies has been put squarely in the spotlight since the 
outbreak of the current global financial and economic crisis in August 2007. As 
governments worldwide have devised billion dollar stimulus packages, debates have 
raged in both the media and academia surrounding the effectiveness of such measures. This 
Working Paper attempts to provide an overview of the theory and empirical evidence on the 
effects of fiscal policies, in the present context of global recession and financial distress. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 1, the basic theoretical elements underlying the 
concept of fiscal multipliers are presented. Section 2 reviews the literature concerning fiscal 
stabilisation policy in times of liquidity traps and credit crunches. Section 3 outlines the core 
principles governing efficient fiscal stimulus programmes. Section 4 surveys the evidence in the 
literature on the size of fiscal multipliers in alternative methodological frameworks. Section 5 
gives evidence from NIME, the Federal Planning Bureau’s macroeconometric world model, on 
the size of fiscal multipliers in the euro area for four different types of stimulus measures. 
Evaluations carried out with the NIME model of the fiscal stimulus plans put in place in the 
euro area and the US are presented in sections 6 and 7, respectively. Finally, section 8 provides 
the reader with a macroeconomic projection for the world economy integrating the fiscal 
stimulus plans for the euro area and the US. This last section also provides a brief discussion of 
the risks and uncertainties surrounding the outlook for the world economy. 
1.  Basic textbook fiscal multipliers: What do they tell us? 
During the Great Depression years of the 1930s, John Maynard Keynes explained that the cause 
of the high unemployment was insufficient demand. Aggregate demand had fallen to a level 
below that necessary to ensure the full and optimal utilisation of the economy’s productive 
capacities, in terms of both labour and capital utilisation. Left to themselves, economies could 
remain in such a state of insufficient demand indefinitely. The answer to this deficiency was for 
the government to boost demand and bring the level of aggregate demand up to the level of 
optimal aggregate supply, thus ensuring full employment and stable inflation. 
Government intervention in the economy happens through both the expenditure side and the 
income side. On the expenditure side, government outlays are partly linked to mechanisms laid 
down in laws. These public expenditures are commonly referred to as non-discretionary or 
entitlement spending. Spending on other items is called discretionary, because governments can 
decide to change the level of spending on these items without going through changes in 
legislation. Most income is usually raised through taxation rates, which are commonly laid 
down in laws and are thus non-discretionary. 
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Changes in the business cycle have a direct influence on government income and expenditure 
levels, even without any changes in discretionary spending. Indeed, in a recession, 
unemployment levels rise and lead to automatic increases in the unemployment benefits paid 
out. This in turn tends to mitigate the effect of the cyclical downturn on income and 
employment. Similarly, a recession can lead to a decline in household incomes and push 
households into lower average tax brackets. This tends to increase after-tax incomes and 
mitigate the effect of the cyclical downturn on income and employment, while leading to 
reduced tax receipts for the government. 
Yet, alongside the working of the government’s automatic fiscal stabilisers, a government can 
also intervene directly in the economy through discretionary fiscal policy, enhancing or counter-
balancing the effects of automatic stabilisers. 
In the standard, two-sector Keynesian expenditure model, a nation’s output or aggregate supply 
is written as  AS . The nation’s aggregate demand,  AD , is the sum of private consumption 
expenditure, C , private investment, I , and government spending, G . Furthermore, aggregate 
demand is equal to aggregate income, Y : 
  Y G I C AD = + + = .   (1) 
Aggregate private disposable income, YD, is 
  T Y YD − = .   (2) 
In this model, equilibrium is obtained when ex ante aggregate income, Y , is equal to ex post 
aggregate supply,  AS : 
  AS G I C AD = + + = .   (3) 
Assume also a simple linear consumption function, where aggregate real private-consumption 
expenditure is a function of disposable income: 
  ) ( T Y c a YD c a C − ⋅ + = ⋅ + =  with  1 0 ≤ ≤ c .   (4) 
Then, substituting (4) into (1), we find 
  G I T Y c a Y + + − ⋅ + = ) ( .   (5) 
Solving for Y , we find 
  [] )
1
(
1
1
T
c
c
G I a
c
Y ⋅
−
− + + ⋅
−
= .   (6) 
Equation (6) states that the multiplier for government expenditure is 
c − 1
1  and that the multiplier 
for (lump-sum) taxation is 
c
c
− 1
, where c is the macroeconomic marginal propensity to 
consume out of disposable income. 
The interpretation of this multiplier is as follows. An increase of 100 euros in government 
spending would fall into the pocket of a first set of households and firms; these households and 
firms would spend a fraction, c, of this income, implying that  100 × c  euros would once again 
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fall into the pocket of a second set of households and firms. This mechanism can go on 
indefinitely, leading to a multiplication of spending induced by the initial government outlay. 
Adding up all the spending, we find the following series: 
  ...) 1 ( 100 ... ) 100 ( ) 100 ( )) 100 ( ( ) 100 ( 100
4 3 2 3 2 + + + + + ⋅ = + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + c c c c c c c c c .   (7) 
This infinite geometric series  ...) 1 (
4 3 2 + + + + + c c c c  converges to 
c − 1
1 , which is known as 
the government spending multiplier. The spending multiplier is given by the inverse of one 
minus the slope of the aggregate expenditure equation. 
Similarly, the interpretation of the government tax multiplier is as follows. A reduction of 100 
euros in the government’s lump-sum tax take would leave a supplement of 100 euros in the 
pockets of households, raising their disposable income. These households would spend a 
fraction,  c, of this supplemental income, implying that the  100 × c  euros they would spend 
would once again fall into the pocket of a set of households and firms; this second set of 
households and firms would also spend a fraction, c, of this income, implying that  100 × ×c c  
euros would fall back into the pocket of a third set of households and firms. 
This mechanism can go on indefinitely, leading to a multiplication of spending induced by the 
initial government tax cut. Adding up all the spending produced by the tax cut, we find the 
following series: 
  ...) 1 ( 100 ... ) 100 ( ) 100 ( ) 100 ( ) 100 (
4 3 2 4 3 2 + + + + + ⋅ ⋅ = + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ c c c c c c c c c    (8) 
which converges to  ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
−
⋅ ⋅
c
c
1
1
100 . 
Note now that the effect of a tax cut of €100 is equal to the effect of a rise in public spending of 
€100 minus the initial rise in spending made by the government. Hence, the tax multiplier is 
equal to the negative of the public spending multiplier minus 1. 
The lump-sum tax multiplier is thus equal to 
  ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
−
− = ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ −
−
−
c
c
c 1
1
1
1
.   (9) 
The absolute value of the tax multiplier is necessarily smaller than the public expenditure 
multiplier. Furthermore, the size of both multipliers clearly depends on the magnitude of the 
parameter  c, which is the macroeconomic marginal propensity to consume out of disposable 
income. If c tends towards its upper limit of 1, both the spending multiplier and the absolute 
value of the tax multiplier tend towards  ∞ + ; if c tends towards its lower limit of 0, the 
spending multiplier tends towards 1, while the absolute value of the tax multiplier tends towards 
0. 
A marginal propensity to consume of 0.6 would lead to a public spending multiplier of 2.50 and 
a tax multiplier of  2.50 1 – ( ) – 1.50 – = . This means that a public sector economic stimulus of 
€100 through higher public spending would lead to an overall increase in economic activity of 
€250, while the same initial stimulus provided through a tax cut would lead to an overall 
increase in economic activity of €150. 4 | PATRICK VAN BRUSSELEN 
These basic closed-economy multipliers can be refined by taking into account endogenous taxes 
(i.e. a tax rate) and trade with the rest of the world. Assume that the government’s tax receipts 
are a function of aggregate income: 
  Y t T T ⋅ + = 0 . (10) 
Assume that imports are also a function of aggregate disposable income: 
  ) ( 0 T Y m M M − ⋅ + =  (11) 
The open-economy public spending multiplier can be shown to be 
  [] )) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( 1
1
t m t c − ⋅ − − ⋅ −
   (12) 
with   1 , 0 ≤ ≤ m t  , where m  is the marginal propensity to consume from imports. 
The open-economy tax multiplier becomes 
  [] )) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( 1 t m t c
m c
− ⋅ − − ⋅ −
+ −
 with  1 , 0 ≤ ≤ m t  (13) 
Clearly, replacing the assumption of lump-sum taxation with a tax rate and introducing the 
possibility for households to spend their disposable income on imported goods and services 
reduces the potency of government intervention in the economy. 
Assuming a marginal propensity to consume (c) of 0.60, a tax rate (t) of 0.50 and a marginal 
propensity to consume out of imports (m ) of 0.30, the public spending multiplier falls to 1.18 
and the tax multiplier falls to -0.35. Thus, in this case, an initial economic stimulus by the public 
sector of €100 through higher public spending would lead to an overall increase in economic 
output and income of €118, while the same initial stimulus provided through a tax cut would 
lead to an overall increase in economic activity of €35. 
2.  Economic stabilisation policies in times of credit crunches 
and liquidity traps 
In this section, we discuss the relative effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy in the context 
of an open economy. We go on to present the classic case of fiscal policy in the context of a 
liquidity trap. 
2.1  An analysis of the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy 
2.1.1  A simple analytical framework: Hicksian IS-LM analysis 
In discussing the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy, two polar cases can be analysed in 
the standard Hicksian IS-LM  framework. In this framework, recall that the IS  curve or 
schedule represents the combinations of interest rates and aggregate output levels for which the 
goods market is in equilibrium. It is negatively sloped because a higher level of the interest rate 
reduces investment spending. The LM  curve represents the combinations of interest rates and 
aggregate output levels for which real money balances (and the bond market) are in equilibrium. FISCAL STABILISATION PLANS AND THE OUTLOOK FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY | 5 
It is positively sloped because a higher level of the interest rate reduces the demand for real 
money balances and an increase in aggregate income raises the demand for real money 
balances. 
2.1.2 Monetary  policy 
First, there is the classical case in which the LM  curve becomes a vertical curve. A vertical 
LM  schedule signals that demand for real money balances is completely insensitive to the 
interest rate. This is called the classical case because it represents the situation where 
GDP k Y P k M ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ = , corresponding to the quantity theory of money, which states that for 
a given price vector, P , the level of real output is completely determined by the supply of 
nominal money balances. In this situation, depicted in Figure 1, fiscal policy is completely 
ineffective in stimulating the economy while monetary policy can have a maximum effect on 
output. Indeed, an increase in the money supply shifts the LM  schedule out to the right, from 
0 Y  to  1 Y , leading to a strong increase in output and a parallel decline in the interest rate. An 
increase in government expenditure, which shifts the IS  curve up and to the right, would lead 
to a complete crowding-out of private spending, thus pushing up the interest rate, from  0 i  to 
1 i , and leaving the output level unchanged. 
Figure 1. Ineffective fiscal policy in the IS-LM framework  
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Second, there is the case of the liquidity trap, depicted in Figure 2, in which the LM  curve 
becomes horizontal and where changes in the quantity of money are unable to shift it. In this 
case, households are prepared to hold any amount of real money balances rather than increase 
their portfolio balance of less liquid bonds. Changes in the stock of money in circulation have 
no effect on the LM  curve, implying that monetary policy no longer affects the interest rate, no 
longer affects investment or savings decisions, and no longer affects output or income. This is 
the situation that presents itself when nominal interest rates fall to their zero lower bound. 
Households then prefer to hold cash balances rather than invest in less liquid bonds that yield 
zero interest. Note that an economy can also find itself in a liquidity trap with a positive interest 
rate, as in the case of a seizing-up of credit linked to increased perceptions of market or 
counterparty risk. If this situation leads to lower private final demand, fiscal policy can be 
relatively potent, as an increase in government spending will not lead to any significant 
crowding-out of private consumption or investment. 6 | PATRICK VAN BRUSSELEN 
Figure 2. Ineffective monetary policy in the IS-LM framework  
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2.1.3 Fiscal  policy 
Having already reviewed the potential for economic stimulus through fiscal policy in the case of 
the classical model and in the case of a liquidity trap, we now turn to a summary analysis of 
fiscal policy in the usual IS-LM framework. 
Figure 3 indicates that an increase in government spending or a decline in taxation pushes the 
IS  schedule to the right, bringing about an increase in both output, which rises from  0 Y  to  1 Y , 
and the interest rate, which rises from  0 i  to  1 i . For any  G Δ  rise in public spending, 
equilibrium output must rise by  G mg Δ ⋅ , where mg  is the fiscal spending multiplier. In an 
open economy operating in a flexible exchange rate regime, the rise in the interest rate would 
lead to a rise in the external value of the country’s currency and to a deterioration in the 
country’s current account balance. In the absence of any crowding-out or upward pressure on 
the interest rate, the economy’s equilibrium output would rise from  0 Y  to  2 Y . 
Figure 3. Fiscal policy effectiveness in the IS-LM framework 
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2.2  Monetary and fiscal policy effectiveness in a liquidity trap 
The US has recently entered the universe of the liquidity trap as the rate for both the target 
federal funds and the effective Fed funds fell to near-zero levels in early 2009. Japan has been in 
this situation for more than a decade, with the problem of deflation adding to its predicament. In 
the UK and the euro area, both headline and core measures of inflation rates are moderating. 
The reaction of the Bank of England has been to make large cuts in its short-term interest rate 
target (the minimum bid rate for money market 3-month sterling), which is now rapidly 
approaching the zero lower bound. The European Central Bank (ECB) has cut its main policy 
rate (since October 2008, a fixed rate on the ECB’s main refinancing operations) rather less 
rapidly, but seems to be on the verge of following the general downward trend towards near-
zero policy rates. 
It appears that the US, the UK and the euro area are all swiftly moving into the territory of zero 
interest rates and possibly deflation. If economic conditions continue to deteriorate and these 
major world economies do end up with zero rates and falling prices, what policies can be 
implemented to return to trend real GDP growth, along with ‘normal’, positive, nominal policy 
rates and rising prices? The Japanese example sheds some light on these policy issues. 
At the end of the 1990s, Japan appeared to be effectively mired in a deflationary and liquidity 
trap, where the general price level was declining and where the nominal policy rate was 
effectively at its zero lower bound. This situation led to renewed research on the causes of 
liquidity traps and on the policy options that could help economies to emerge from such traps. 
Ever since the end of World War II, the Japanese government has stressed the overwhelming 
importance of domestic saving as a way to economic growth. This promotion of thrift has 
persisted ever since, leading to rapid investment- and export-led economic growth; it has, 
however, also provided the underpinnings for the financial asset and property bubbles that 
emerged in the 1980s. By the early 1990s, these two asset bubbles had burst. The structurally 
weak private-consumption growth on the domestic front could not pick up the slack, while the 
country’s export growth was adversely affected by a rapid currency appreciation (IMF, 1998). 
At the same time, the country began to suffer from a decline in productivity growth, just as 
awareness increased about the future effects of Japan’s population dynamics on potential 
economic growth. The economy plunged into a combination of low output growth and falling 
prices, which were still largely prevalent in early 2009. 
Japanese monetary policy rates have been at their lower bound for many years now, to no effect 
on the country’s deflationary spiral. The effectiveness of fiscal policy in pulling an economy out 
of stagnation also appears to be limited, judged on a cursory examination of Japan’s fiscal 
policy record over the 1990s. Nevertheless, it has been shown that even in the case of the 
Japanese economy, expansionary fiscal policy did, in fact, have a positive impact on growth 
(Posen, 1998). The disappointing results stem from the fact that the fiscal stimulus packages 
implemented in Japan proved to be too small and were implemented in such a stop-and-go 
manner as to finally lead to little overall economic stimulus. 
Claims that the Japanese government has spent in excess of ¥75 trillion over the 1990s in efforts 
to boost growth and end deflation appear to be largely exaggerated, as no more than one-third of 
this amount is thought to have been effectively injected into the economy. In 1995, a large 
effective stimulus package was adopted, leading to a significant rise in real GDP growth in 
1996. This growth momentum was then undercut by contractionary fiscal positions in 1996 and 
1997. On balance, it is estimated that Japan’s fiscal stance was only marginally expansionary 
over the 1990s; the discretionary, cyclically-adjusted budgetary position was barely negative 
over the decade. Hence, it appears that when fiscal policy was implemented in a significant way 
in Japan, the effects on short-term output growth were manifest. 8 | PATRICK VAN BRUSSELEN 
Turning to standard economic theory, the IS-LM framework indicates that when an economy 
finds itself in deflation and in a liquidity trap, the LM schedule is horizontal. Attempts by 
monetary authorities to boost economic growth through increases in the monetary base are 
ineffective, as the nominal interest rate cannot fall below zero. Attempts to use monetary policy 
are then likened to ‘pushing on a string’. The result of the simple IS-LM model holds even in 
models where prices are fully flexible and where complete, intertemporal budget constraints 
apply (Krugman, 1998b). At the same time, it has been shown that although monetary 
expansion is by itself ineffective, credible commitments to increase the money supply and 
generate current and future inflation can be an effective policy response. An effective monetary 
policy for pulling an economy out of a deflationary liquidity trap should be based on 
quantitative easing and unconventional open-market operations targeting longer maturities of 
the yield curve, as well as actions and announcements aimed at increasing market expectations 
of current and future inflation (Krugman, 2000). In particular, monetary policy should adopt an 
explicit inflation target, with the target rate set high enough to produce a zero or negative real 
interest rate. 
Furthermore, in the IS-LM model, fiscal policies could in principle bootstrap the economy out 
of its liquidity trap. In practice, however, this would require either that the fiscal stimulus be 
massive and sustained (leading to credibility issues regarding the long-term sustainability of 
public finances with a possible increased risk of sovereign default) or that the economy is 
trapped in a ‘low-level equilibrium’. In a multiple equilibrium framework, an economy’s 
equilibrium can be durably modified by temporary policies such as a short-term fiscal boost. It 
appears more likely that Japan’s liquidity trap had a structural origin, linked to population 
dynamics and declining multifactor productivity growth, rather than the economy falling by 
chance into such a low-level equilibrium. 
Hence, escaping from a deflationary liquidity trap requires a combination of a credible and 
sufficiently high, permanent inflation target and accompanying expansionary fiscal policies. 
Fiscal measures are all the more appropriate for a low-growth liquidity trap because the shadow 
price of marginal government spending is then particularly low (Blinder, 2004). It has further 
been argued that an exchange rate policy aiming at a temporary currency 
devaluation/depreciation can also help in providing additional economic stimulus by increasing 
price competitiveness and raising exports (Svensson, 2004). Japan’s current predicament seems 
rooted in the inability of the country’s monetary authorities to generate expectations of 
sufficiently high and permanent inflation and from the absence of a significant and sustained 
fiscal stimulus. 
2.3  Policy responses in a risk-related liquidity trap 
The traditional view of the liquidity trap is one in which an economy’s nominal interest rates 
have fallen to their zero lower bound. Yet, such a trap need not always present itself with 
effective nominal zero rates. The more general characterisation of the liquidity trap is a situation 
in which monetary policy is unable to boost economic activity by changing the money base. 
This may be the case because nominal interest rates are down against their lower bound: in this 
situation, economic agents have no incentive to exchange base money balances for interest-
bearing bonds and prefer to hoard money rather than boost investment. Monetary policy may 
lose its effectiveness against a background of high-risk aversion. In such a case, the 
transmission channel can break down, implying that monetary policy aiming at a specific 
interest rate target for a specific set of securities would be unable to affect rates on other 
securities of similar maturities or to affect securities carrying other maturities. In such   
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circumstances, significant spreads can appear between the risk-free yield on government debt 
and the yield on more risky private-sector debt. This is the case that presents itself in a credit 
crunch. 
In situations where the supply of credit seizes up, the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus and of 
monetary policy through the usual open market operations is limited, implying that it is 
necessary for the government to take measures to restore the normal functioning of credit 
markets (Spilimbergo et al., 2008; IMF, 2009b). This is all the more so if the flow of credit is 
impaired by the appearance of uncertainty in markets, in which case the usual means of risk 
evaluation break down (Knight, 1921). If it is market liquidity that disappears, the central bank 
can play the role of market maker of last resort. If a financial institution is unable to finance 
itself in the open market because of liquidity constraints, the central bank could also play the 
role of lender of last resort (Buiter, 2008). Still, both traditional and unconventional intervention 
by central banks in financial markets could prove to be ineffective in stimulating the wider 
economy if financial institutions hoard liquidity rather than passing it on through lending. 
The hoarding of liquidity is particularly observed in cases where banks – defined as all 
institutions that borrow short and lend long – are heavily exposed to uncertainty linked to 
possible write-downs in the value of some of their assets. In such cases, banks may be tempted 
to build up precautionary cash balances to enable them to deal with liquidity problems 
stemming from their inability to sell impaired or toxic assets in order to meet their liabilities. 
Furthermore, financial markets have also become wary of counterparty solvency risks. These 
factors have led to exceptional increases in rates charged on corporate credit. By the end of the 
first quarter of 2009, the spread on lending to US financial corporates
1 was about 100 basis 
points; the spread on investment-grade, US non-financial corporate credit
2 was around 300 basis 
points, while high-yield spreads were around 2,500 basis points. Credit conditions have 
remained tight and spreads high in the euro area too, where bank loans remain the dominant 
form of credit to corporations. 
In such an environment, the monetary and fiscal channels of economic stabilisation by 
themselves will be insufficient or ineffective. These policies could then be accompanied by 
•  a mandatory clean-up of bank balance sheets taking the form of outright temporary 
nationalisation of insolvent banks;  
•  the mandatory creation of a “bad bank” (Bulow and Klemperer, 2009) or a “good bank” 
(Buiter, 2009b) to clean up the banking sector;  
•  a government-backed credit insurance scheme intended to reduce private-sector risk 
premia and to ensure a renewed flow of credit (Blanchard, 2009; Duy and Magud, 2009); 
and  
•  an improved macro-prudential framework geared towards minimising systemic risk and 
moral hazard, which may require a break-up of financial institutions that are proven to 
have become too big or too connected to fail (Wyplosz, 2008). 
                                                      
1 The TED spread measures the difference between the 3-month eurodollar Libor rate and the 3-month 
Treasury bill rate. 
2 More specifically, this refers to the yield spread between the average investment-grade corporate bond 
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3.  Optimal design of fiscal stabilisation programmes 
Standard economic theory indicates that in situations with developed and functioning financial 
markets and an independent central bank with the appropriate know-how, monetary policy is 
usually the best response to an effective or anticipated downturn in economic activity, due to the 
speed with which monetary authorities can modify market interest rates. Even though it may 
take several quarters before the full impact of a change in the monetary policy stance is felt in 
the economy, the first effects materialise quite rapidly and implementation lags are, in any case, 
shorter than those usually associated with budgetary processes (Wieland, 2008). 
In all cases, an economic downturn will also lead to an autonomous counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy through the working of the automatic fiscal stabilisers. But if the expected downturn 
appears to be particularly sudden and large, a case can be made for an accompanying 
expansionary and discretionary fiscal policy. This is particularly relevant in circumstances in 
which monetary authorities have all but exhausted the scope for conventional monetary policy 
intervention through reductions in nominal interest rates. It has also been shown to be the 
optimal response in the face of uncertainty as to the true impact of monetary and fiscal policy 
options (Brainard, 1967). Furthermore, recent research indicates that an active discretionary 
fiscal policy based on counter-cyclical public spending can be more important for growth than a 
fiscal policy solely based on automatic fiscal stabilisers (Aghion and Kharroubi, 2008). 
When monetary policy is deemed insufficient to stabilise the economy on its own, or in the case 
of a liquidity trap, an expansionary fiscal policy should be devised in a manner that corresponds 
to a number of basic principles. There are the now well-known three ‘Ts’: an expansionary 
fiscal policy should be timely, targeted and temporary (Elmendorf and Furman, 2008). Then, 
there are the three ‘Cs’: an expansionary fiscal policy should also be contingent, credible and 
coordinated. 
Timeliness means that the inside and outside implementation lags of fiscal policy should be 
minimal. Inside lags are those linked to the administrative and legislative processes. Outside 
lags are those linked to the effective implementation of policy decisions, such as the time 
necessary for work on an infrastructure project to begin. Note that the outside lags of spending 
projects can be relatively long, while the outside lags of tax rebates can be quasi nil. A fiscal 
stimulus package should be articulated so that it does not begin to affect the economy too early, 
nor affect it too late in the economic downturn. 
Targeted means that an optimal fiscal stimulus should affect only those components of 
aggregate demand – through either spending increases or tax cuts – that would provide the 
greatest overall boost to the economy. For instance, in the case of tax cuts or rebates, targeting 
these measures on lower-income and liquidity-constrained households ensures a greater impact 
on household consumption expenditure than targeting them on higher-income households. In 
liquidity trap or deflationary conditions, economic theory further suggests that a discretionary, 
public stabilisation policy should be geared towards increased public spending rather than 
towards tax cuts. Tax cuts could even prove to be counter-productive in deflationary situations 
(Eggertsson, 2009). 
Temporary means that the fiscal stimulus package should, in principle, not be open-ended – as 
this could pave the way to ever-increasing fiscal intervention and an exponential build-up of 
government deficits. Fiscal stimulus programmes should seek to raise output and close output 
gaps as quickly as possible and not lead to long-term and unsustainable deficits. Furthermore, as 
stabilisation packages, they should not endeavour to exceed their role by mixing together 
measures for economic stabilisation and longer-term measures to enhance growth. 
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To these three Ts, one can add the three Cs: contingency, credibility and coordination. The first 
of these additional principles is contingency. Contingency means that when devising a fiscal 
stimulus package, the government should prepare for additional stimulus measures in case the 
initial package proves to be too limited to achieve its goal. Without prejudice to the principle of 
implementing temporary measures, the fiscal boost must in fine prove to be effective, lest the 
initial measures lead only to an increase in public deficits. 
The second additional principle is credibility. Credibility means that when devising a fiscal 
stimulus package, the government should tailor its package to the effective needs of the 
economy. A package that is too small to provide a significant boost to the economy or that 
would provide too temporary a boost would lead to a build-up of public deficits and debt 
without leading to a sustained recovery. In particular, a credible stimulus plan must be big 
enough to stabilise – or even close – an economy’s output gap, underpinning output growth so 
that the economy’s labour and capital resources remain as fully utilised as possible. This is 
necessary because an economy that is functioning below its potential output level and that is 
caught in a liquidity trap is naturally inclined to exhibit declining prices and sub-par output 
growth. 
The third and final additional principle is coordination. Coordination means that when devising 
a fiscal stimulus package, the government should minimise potential losses due to ‘leakages’. 
Economic stimulus plans implemented in increasingly open economies suffer from a heightened 
risk of import leakages, whereby increased domestic demand in one country allows a 
neighbouring country to increase its own output and exports. A country can thus benefit from 
another neighbouring country’s fiscal stimulus without having to increase its own public 
spending, paving the way for ‘free-riding’ and ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ attitudes. These 
behaviours can be circumvented through international policy coordination, which can increase 
the effectiveness of policy responses for all concerned (Beetsma et al., 2001). Coordination 
should not be taken to mean an identical amount of fiscal stimulus in every country. Rather, 
fiscal packages should be tailored to individual countries, reflecting their ‘fiscal space’, i.e. the 
budgetary room available to governments after accounting for their individual public deficits 
and debt, current account positions and their ability to meet their commitments relative to future 
demographic challenges (Corsetti and Müller, 2008; Heller, 2005). The alternative to 
coordination could be a protectionist backlash, where countries implementing fiscal packages 
adopt the second-best solution of restricting trade flows to stem import leakages (Rodrik, 
2008a). 
All in all, poorly crafted fiscal stabilisation packages might result in too little economic boost 
coming too late, and lead only to rising interest rates and increased public borrowing and debt. 
In this case, having no fiscal stimulus could be better than a badly thought-out stimulus plan, in 
limiting the present value of the sum of current and future output losses. 
4. Empirical  evaluations  of fiscal multipliers 
The following section presents the values of fiscal multipliers that are found through the 
historical narrative-record method, through the analysis of the impulse responses of variable 
auto regressive models and through simulation experiments of macroeconomic models. 
4.1  A practical note on the presentation of empirical results 
Fiscal multipliers provide a measure of the absolute effect of a change in one ‘independent’ 
variable,  x  (e.g. public spending), on another ‘dependant’ variable,  y  (e.g. the level of real 
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and dependant variables and the relative sizes of these two variables. Indeed, the multiplier has 
been defined as   x
y
Δ
Δ   and therefore the variations of the numerator and denominator are not 
unit-independent. 
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y
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Another possible presentation of the effect of a change in one independent variable on another 
dependant variable is provided by the measure of ‘elasticity’. Elasticity is defined as the 
percentage change in a dependant variable,  y , produced by a percentage change in an 
independent variable, x : 
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Hence, it also appears that the concept of elasticity and ‘multiplier’ are linked but distinct: the 
elasticity is equal to the multiplier multiplied by the ratio of the independent variable  x  to the 
dependant variable  y : 
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Studies of the effects of discretionary fiscal policy present results in a variety of ways. They are 
sometimes presented in the form of multipliers, sometimes in the form of elasticities and 
sometimes in yet another manner. Indeed, results are often presented in terms of the dependant 
variable’s ( y ) percentage deviation from a baseline value, following a shock on an independent 
variable (x ), where the shock on the independent variable (x ) is expressed in terms of its size 
relative to (or as a percentage of) a country’s GDP in the baseline and for a reference year. (For 
example, GDP increases by α% from its baseline level following an increase in variable  x  
equal to 1% of baseline GDP in year T.) This result should not be misconstrued to be a 
conventional measure of the elasticity of the dependant variable  y  to the independent variable 
x , as it only represents a type of ‘semi-elasticity’. 
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In the studies that are surveyed below, the term ‘multiplier’ is sometimes used to refer to an 
actual multiplier, sometimes to an elasticity and other times to a semi-elasticity. The ambiguities 
surrounding the form in which the results are given are removed wherever possible, but the 
reader will have to take care in the interpretation of multiplier results. 
4.2  The narrative record method of evaluating fiscal multipliers 
The narrative record method attempts to discriminate between automatic and discretionary 
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regarding discretionary changes in fiscal stances. This analysis is then combined with an 
analysis of the observed historical changes in output, so as to obtain a measure of the effects of 
discretionary fiscal policy. 
These methods, recently applied to the analysis of taxation for the US economy, indicate that 
tax cuts have large and persistent effects on output. Traditional measures of tax multipliers are 
suggested to be excessively small owing to an “omitted variables” bias (Romer and Romer, 
2007). Estimates derived from this method also suggest that the impact of tax changes on the 
US economy has declined over time. The size of the effect on output largely stems from a large 
reaction in private investment rather than consumption expenditure (Table 1). 
Table 1. Maximum effects of an increase in taxes on US economic activity 
  Effects 
Private consumption  -2.6 
Private gross investment  -12.6 
GDP -3.0 
Note: Impact of a tax increase equivalent to 1 percentage point of 
GDP (in %). 
Source: Results from Romer and Romer (2007).  
This narrative study of the effects of tax cuts indicates that the effects of fiscal multipliers (the 
tax cut multipliers and by extension the public spending multipliers as well) could be 
remarkably high. 
Other narrative studies, based on the identification of autonomous changes in public spending, 
arrive at the conclusion that an increase in public spending in the US can have positive effects 
on real GDP while leading to significant negative effects on private consumption expenditure 
and real wages. The GDP to public spending multiplier could lie between 1 and 1.4 (Ramey, 
2008; Ramey and Shapiro, 1998). Note, however, that these last results are based on wartime or 
defence spending data, covering periods that present very particular methodological difficulties. 
4.3  Multiplier estimates from selected VAR models 
Alongside the approach of macroeconometric model simulation, there is now extensive 
empirical literature on the application of time series techniques to the question of the impact of 
fiscal policy. Vector autoregressions (VARs) allow for relatively little prior specification of 
dynamics, which is an interesting feature for the investigation of the multivariate properties of 
time series data. The application of VAR techniques to the study of fiscal policy usually implies 
using a dummy variable approach for identifying discretionary fiscal shocks, or the structural 
VAR approach relying on institutional information for identifying the endogenous responses of 
fiscal variables to changes in overall activity from which the discretionary fiscal shocks are then 
inferred (Perotti, 2000). 
The standard dummy VAR approach for the US economy usually indicates little response of 
activity (private consumption) to an autonomous increase in fiscal outlays (Edelberg et al., 
1999). Still, the nature of the fiscal dummy variable can lead to difficulties in interpreting the 
impulse responses and these results are often judged unconvincing. 
The structural VAR (SVAR) approach indicates that activity can be positively and sizably 
affected in the medium term by an autonomous increase in public spending (Blanchard and 
Perotti, 1999). 14 | PATRICK VAN BRUSSELEN 
Yet VAR estimates of the effects of fiscal stimulus measures have also been shown to produce 
negative responses to autonomous increases in public spending. This strain of evaluation stems 
from observations of the evolution of activity and cyclically-adjusted fiscal positions in a 
number of EU countries that underwent significant fiscal consolidation in the 1990s. VAR 
estimates allowing for varying parameter values over periods of low and high deficit and debt 
ratios indicate that an increase in public spending raises activity in periods of low deficit and 
debt ratios, but reduces activity in periods of high deficit and debt ratios (Perotti, 1999). 
More recent and detailed VAR estimates of impulse responses to shocks on government 
spending and taxation continue to give very mixed messages as to the effects of fiscal policies, 
both across time and countries (Perotti, 2005). 
As Tables 2 and 3 show, it would appear that the effects of fiscal policy on GDP are generally 
small, that tax cuts do not have a more rapid impact on the economy than increases in public 
spending, and that fiscal policy has tended to become less effective over the period 1960–2001. 
Recent research indicates that the robustness of the traditional VAR results, showing a positive 
effect of public spending on private consumption and output in the US, could suffer from a 
number of identification, aggregation and timing problems. Correcting for these methodological 
issues, VAR results show negative effects of public spending increases on private consumption 
(Ramey, 2008). It is also suggested that these last results are themselves biased by the type of 
public spending (US defence spending) they cover and by their failure to control for the effects 
of tax increases and wartime rationing of private consumption. 
Table 2. Effects of a shock to government spending on private consumption  
  On-impact 
effect
Long-term
effect
Maximum 
effect 
Fiscal dummy VAR  0.1 0.0 0.1 
Non-varying structural VAR  0.5 0.9 1.2 
Varying structural VAR   
High deficit case  -0.4 – – 
Low deficit case  0.7 – – 
Note: Impact of an increase in public spending of 1 percentage point (p.p.) of GDP; response of private 
consumption (in p.p. of GDP). 
Sources: Edelberg et al. (1999); Blanchard and Perotti (1999); Perotti (1999). 
Table 3. Effects of a rise in public spending on GDP (cumulative responses)  
  US (West) 
Germany 
UK 
 1  year 3  years 1  year 3  years 1  year 3  years 
Period 1960–2001*  -0.82 -3.77 -0.01 -1.27 -0.70 -1.33 
Sub-period 1: 1960–79*  1.13 3.68 0.41 -0.11 0.48 0.10 
Sub-period 2: 1980–2001*  0.31 0.10 0.40 -1.38 -0.22 -1.23 
* (West) Germany: Sample period is 1960–89; sub-period 1: 1960–74; sub-period 2: 1975–89. 
Note: Impact of an increase in public spending equivalent to 1 p.p. of GDP; annualised cumulative response of 
GDP (in p.p. of GDP). 
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Table 4. Effects of a decline in taxes on GDP (cumulative responses)  
  US  (West) 
Germany 
UK 
 1  year 3  years 1  year 3  years 1  year 3  years 
Period 1960–2001*  -1.12 -4.75 0.24 -0.36 -0.33 -1.07 
Sub-period 1: 1960–79*  0.69 2.64 -0.22 0.07 0.10 0.16 
Sub-period 2: 1980–2001*  -0.43 -2.11 0.02 -0.29 -0.23 -0.91 
* (West) Germany: Sample period is 1960–89; sub-period 1: 1960–74; sub-period 2: 1975–89. 
Note: Impact of a tax cut equivalent to 1 p.p. of GDP; annualised cumulative response of GDP (in p.p. of 
GDP). 
Source: Perotti (2005).  
4.4  Multiplier estimates from selected macroeconometric models 
Another empirical approach to estimating the effect of fiscal policies on economic activity is the 
use of macroeconomic models. A difficulty that presents itself in this approach is that different 
kinds of models produce diverse results. Differences in theoretical specifications, in the 
definition of fiscal shocks and in the implementation of these shocks in the model simulation 
sometimes lead to large variations in the outcomes (Hemming et al., 2002). Crucial to the 
outcomes are the initial level of government deficits and debt, the way the model handles such 
variables as monetary policy and exchange rates, the modelling of liquidity constraints that 
agents may face, the way agents build their expectations about future fiscal policy, inflation and 
income growth, the duration of the shocks and the expected or unexpected nature of these 
shocks. 
A number of results are given in Table 5. The table presents government spending and tax 
multipliers from the well-known multi-country econometric models of the IMF (Multimod), the 
OECD (Interlink) and the European Commission (Quest II). These results are additionally 
accompanied by estimates that have been produced by other models for major countries and 
economic areas. 
To provide a basis for comparison, the table shows results for four different areas and two 
different timeframes. The short run is defined as either the first-period impact (the first-year 
effect for annual models and the first-quarter effect for quarterly models) or the corresponding 
cumulative, two-period impact. The first column of the table provides information on the model 
used to produce the multiplier estimate, the institution to which the model belongs, the 
publication year of the document in which the multipliers were presented, an indication as to the 
specific conditions under which the multipliers were obtained and a reference to the relevant 
source in the literature. 
Table 5 indicates that, in accordance with what one finds from deriving the textbook open-
economy fiscal multipliers, the public spending multipliers are generally greater than the tax cut 
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Table 5. Fiscal multiplier estimates from selected macroeconometric models  
  US Germany  Japan  Euro  area 
Institution, model name, publication year 
of reference, kind of fiscal policy evaluated 
Short 
run 
Long 
run 
Short 
run 
Long 
run 
Short 
run 
Long 
run 
Short 
run 
Long 
run 
IMF, Multimod, 2001, higher spending 
1/  – – 1.2 -0.2 – – –  – 
IMF, Multimod, 1998, higher spending, exch. 
rate target 
2/  – – – –  1.5 -0.5  – – 
IMF, Multimod, 1998, higher spending, money 
target 
2/  – – – –  0.6 -0.3  – – 
IMF, Multimod, 1998, higher spending, 
inflation target 
2/  – – – –  0.4 -0.2  – – 
IMF, Multimod, 1998, lower taxes 
2/ 0.4  -0.1  –  – – – –  – 
IMF, Multimod, 1996, higher spending, money 
target 
3/   1.1 -0.6 –  – – – –  – 
IMF, Multimod, 1996, lower taxes, money 
target 
3/   0.7 -0.2 –  – – – –  – 
                
OECD, Interlink, 2004, specific, higher 
spending 
4/  – – 0.9  – – –  1.0  – 
OECD, Interlink, 2001, specific, higher 
spending 
5/  1.1  0.1  1.1  -0.2 1.7  0.5 1.2 0.1 
OECD, Interlink, 2001, coordinated, higher 
spending 
6/  1.5 0.2 – –  2.6 1.0  1.9  0.3 
OECD, Interlink, 2001, specific, lower taxes 
7/ 0.4  0.4  0.8  -0.1 1.1  0.5 0.5 0.2 
                
European Commission, Quest II, 2004, higher 
spending 
8/  – – 0.7  – – – –  – 
European Commission, Quest II, 2002, lower 
spending 
9/  – –  -0.9 0.0  – – –  – 
European Commission, Quest II, 2002, lower 
spending 
10/  – –  -0.7 0.0  – – –  – 
European Commission, Quest II, 2001, lower 
taxes 
1/  – – 0.4 -0.0 – – –  – 
European Commission, Quest II, 1997, higher 
spending 
11/  – – 0.5  – – –  0.9  – 
                
NIESR, NiGEM, 2004, higher taxes 
12/  – –  -0.7  – – – –  – 
NIESR, NiGEM, 2001, lower taxes 
1/  – – 1.0 0.3  – – –  – 
               
ECB, area-wide model, 2004, higher spending 
13/ –  – – – –  –  1.1  – 
ECB, area-wide model, 2001, higher spending 
14/ –  – – – –  –  0.9  – 
                
FED, FRB/US, 2002, higher spending 
15/ 1.0  –  –  – – – –  – 
FED, FRB/US, 2002, lower taxes 
16/ 0.4  –  –  – – – –  – 
                
Moody’s, 2009, higher spending 
17/ 1.6  –  –  – – – –  – 
Moody’s, 2009, higher spending 
18/ 1.4  –  –  – – – –  – 
Moody’s, 2009, lower taxes 
19/ 1.3  –  –  – – – –  – 
              
ESRI, 2001, higher spending 
20/  – – – –  1.1  – –  – 
ESRI, 2001, lower taxes 
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FPB, NIME, 2009, higher spending, Taylor 
rule 
22/  1.1 -0.5  –  –  0.9 0.5 0.9 0.0 
FPB, NIME, 2009, higher spending, interest 
rate rule 
22/  1.2 0.3  –  –  1.0 0.6 1.0 0.6 
FPB, NIME, 2009, lower taxes, Taylor rule 
23/ 1.0 -0.4  –  –  0.8 0.3 0.9 0.0 
FPB, NIME, 2009, lower taxes, interest rate 
rule 
23/  1.1 -0.1  –  –  0.9 0.4 1.0 0.6 
FPB, NIME, 2009, higher spending, Taylor 
rule 
24/  1.2 -0.4  –  –  1.1 0.9 1.1 0.3 
FPB, NIME, 2009, lower taxes, Taylor rule 
25/ 1.1 -0.4  –  –  1.0 0.5 1.0 0.1 
Sources: 
1/  As reported in Gros and Hobza (2001). 
2/  Laxton et al. (1998). 
3/  As reported in Hemming et al. (2002). 
4/  As reported in Henry et al. (2004); permanent 1 p.p. of GDP increase of government consumption with respect to 
the baseline. 
5/  Dalsgaard et al. (2001); country-specific shock; permanent 1 p.p. of GDP increase of government consumption of 
goods & services with respect to the baseline; constant real interest rates; constant nominal exchange rates. 
6/ Dalsgaard et al. (2001); worldwide coordinated shock; permanent 1 p.p. of GDP increase of government 
consumption of goods & services with respect to the baseline; constant real interest rates; constant nominal 
exchange rates. 
7/  Dalsgaard et al. (2001); country-specific shock; permanent 1 p.p. of GDP cut in taxes on labour income with 
respect to the baseline; constant real interest rates; constant nominal exchange rates. 
8/  As reported in Henry et al. (2004); permanent 1 p.p. of GDP increase of government consumption with respect to 
the baseline. 
9/  Roeger and in 't Veld (2002); temporary 1 p.p. of GDP decline of government consumption of goods & services 
with respect to the baseline; restrictive monetary policy. 
10/ Roeger et al. (2002); temporary 1 p.p. of GDP decline of government consumption of goods & services with 
respect to the baseline; accommodative monetary policy. 
11/ Roeger and in 't Veld (1997); temporary 1 p.p. of GDP increase of government consumption of goods & services 
with respect to the baseline; EMU interest-rate targeting. 
12/ Al-Eyd and Barrell (2004); temporary 1 p.p. of GDP increase of taxes on labour income with respect to the 
baseline; no fiscal solvency rule; autonomous monetary policy. 
13/ As reported in Henry et al. (2004); permanent 1 p.p. of GDP increase of government consumption with respect to 
the baseline. 
14/ Fagan et al. (2001); permanent 1 p.p. of GDP increase of government consumption with respect to the baseline. 
15/ Elmendorf and Reifschneider (2002); permanent 1 p.p. of GDP increase of government consumption of goods & 
services. 
16/ Elmendorf et al. (2002); permanent 1 p.p. of GDP tax cut on wage income. 
17/ Zandi (2009); multiplier of a temporary increase of government spending on infrastructure. 
18/ Zandi (2009); multiplier of a temporary increase of government spending on aid to state governments. 
19/ Zandi (2009); multiplier of a temporary payroll tax cut. 
20/ Hori et al. (2001); permanent 1 p.p. of GDP increase of government investment with respect to the baseline. 
21/ Hori et al. (2001); permanent 1 p.p. of GDP cut in taxes on labour income with respect to the baseline. 
22/ Belgian Federal Planning Bureau (2009, unpublished); country-specific shock; permanent 1 p.p. of GDP increase 
of government consumption of goods & services with respect to the baseline; no fiscal solvency rule. 
23/ Belgian Federal Planning Bureau (2009, unpublished); country-specific shock; permanent 1 p.p. of GDP cut in 
taxes on labour income with respect to the baseline; no fiscal solvency rule. 
24/ Belgian Federal Planning Bureau (2009, unpublished); worldwide coordinated shock; permanent 1 p.p. of GDP 
increase of government consumption of goods & services with respect to the baseline; no fiscal solvency rule. 
25/ Belgian Federal Planning Bureau (2009, unpublished); worldwide coordinated shock; permanent 1 p.p. of GDP cut 
in taxes on labour income with respect to the baseline; no fiscal solvency rule. 18 | PATRICK VAN BRUSSELEN 
For the US, short-term spending multipliers lie between 1 and 1.6 and short-term tax cut 
multipliers lie between 0.4 and 1.3. For the euro area, the textbook open-economy spending 
multiplier can be expected to be around 1.2 and the tax cut multiplier around 0.4. 
Macroeconometric model estimates of short-term spending multipliers for the euro area appear 
to lie between 0.9 and 1.9, while the short-term tax cut multiplier estimates generally lie 
between 0.5 and 1.0. Hence, notwithstanding the wide degree of variation in the model 
estimates of fiscal multipliers, the basic textbook multipliers appear to correspond relatively 
well to the average of multiplier estimates produced by standard macroeconometric models. 
Table 5 also shows that government spending multipliers are always positive in the short run but 
can be negative in the long run. Spending multipliers fall into a relatively wide range. The 
highest reported spending multiplier is 2.6 in the short run for Japan and 1.6 in the long run for 
the US. The lowest spending multiplier is 0.4 in the short run for Japan and -0.6 in the long run 
for the US. The highest reported short-term tax cut multiplier is 1.3 for the US; the highest long-
term tax cut multiplier is 0.6 for the euro area. The lowest tax cut multipliers are for the US: the 
lowest short-term estimate is 0.4, while the lowest long-term estimate is -0.4. 
The table indicates that the estimates of a multiplier can vary widely, depending notably on the 
underlying simulation assumptions. Results from the IMF’s Multimod model show that the 
public spending multiplier can fall from 1.5 in the case of an exchange rate-targeting rule, to just 
0.4 in the case of an inflation-targeting rule. Results have also been shown to be sensitive to 
assumptions regarding international fiscal policy coordination. Indeed, results from the OECD’s 
Interlink model indicate that the public spending multiplier can fall from 1.5 under international 
policy coordination to 1.1 in the case of country-specific measures. 
4.5  Multiplier estimates from selected DSGE and general equilibrium 
models 
The European Commission’s new Quest III model, which is a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model for the euro area, indicates that in the short run and under favourable 
conditions of highly liquidity-constrained agents, a permanent 1 percentage point (p.p.) of GDP 
increase in government consumption of goods and services with respect to the baseline raises 
euro area GDP by 0.9%. A permanent 1 p.p. of GDP increase in government investment in 
relation to the baseline raises GDP by 1.1%, while a permanent 1 p.p. of GDP cut in taxes on 
labour income from the baseline raises GDP by 0.6% (Ratto et al., 2008) (Table 6). 
Table 6. Multiplier estimates from the European Commission’s Quest III model  
  Short run Long run 
Government consumption  0.89 -0.05 
Government investment  1.05 0.24 
Transfers 0.59 -0.04 
Investment tax credit  1.66 0.37 
Cut in labour taxes  0.60 0.00 
Cut in consumption taxes  0.68 -0.04 
Source: Ratto et al. (2008). 
Simulations carried out with the IMF’s New Keynesian Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal 
Model indicate that a worldwide coordinated increase in government consumption has a short-
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assuming no monetary accommodation (Freedman et al., 2009). Increases in transfers targeted 
at liquidity-constrained households have a short-term GDP multiplier of 1.7 under the 
assumption of monetary accommodation and of 0.5 assuming no monetary accommodation. 
For the US, an increase in government investment has a short-term GDP multiplier of 3.9 in the 
case of a worldwide coordinated measure; the multiplier falls to 2.4 if the US is alone in 
implementing the stimulus measure. For Japan, an increase in targeted transfers from 
government has a short-term GDP multiplier of 1.5 under worldwide coordination; the 
multiplier falls to just 0.5 if Japan is alone in implementing the measure. The model results thus 
appear to be very sensitive to various assumptions, especially on expectations as to long-term 
fiscal sustainability, liquidity constraints, policy coordination and monetary policy. 
Other simulations carried out with the IMF’s general equilibrium Global Fiscal Model indicate 
that a temporary tax cut leads to a long-term fall in GDP of -1.25% for a large economy and to a 
long-term fall in GDP of -0.33% for a small economy (Botman and Kumar, 2006). These 
results, however, are very sensitive to assumptions concerning the planning horizon of 
consumers, liquidity constraints and the characteristics of the production functions. Indeed, a 
longer planning horizon leads to a decline in GDP of -0.23% for a large economy and a lower 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution leads to a decline in GDP of -2.63% for a large economy. 
Still other results indicate that the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies is crucial to the 
evaluation of multipliers (Eggertsson, 2006). Under policy coordination, the public spending 
multiplier lies between 3.4 and 3.8; in the absence of coordination, the public spending 
multiplier is measured to be between 0 and 3.4. 
4.6  What conclusions can be drawn from model-based multiplier 
analyses? 
Evidence on multipliers from empirical macroeconomic models leads to a number of important 
conclusions. Looking at all the results compiled from narrative records, VAR impulse 
responses, econometric models and general equilibrium models, the range of multipliers is very 
wide indeed. Government spending multipliers vary between -3.8 and +3.8; tax cut multipliers 
vary between -4.8 and +3.0 (Table 7). 
Table 7. Range of fiscal multiplier estimates for the US  
  Narrative 
record models 
VAR/SVAR 
models 
Econometric  
models 
GE / DSGE 
models 
  Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Public spending multipliers  1.0 1.4  -3.77  3.68  -0.6 1.6 0.0 3.9 
Tax cut multipliers  – 3.0  -4.75  2.64  -0.4  1.3  -2.63*  -0.23*
* Results for a large economy from the IMF’s Global Fiscal Model – see Botman and Kumar (2006). 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
Results vary most widely for the multiplier estimates derived from VAR models. Nevertheless, 
it has been shown that estimates are very sensitive to specifications and assumptions in all kinds 
of empirical models. Studies have highlighted the important role of the monetary-policy 
reaction function in multiplier evaluations, underscoring the necessity of coordination between 
fiscal and monetary policies.  
Results also indicate that exchange rates play a crucial role in open-economy models, 
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model features or assumptions are found to be critical in deriving multiplier estimates – more 
specifically those linked to the way the model handles liquidity constraints, credibility issues 
regarding long-term fiscal balance, forward-looking behaviour and rationality issues. 
Given these wide-ranging results and their high sensitivity to models and assumptions, it is 
difficult to object to Perotti (2000) when he notes, “Contrary to what the policy discussion 
seems to take for granted, there is clearly no consensus even on the basic effects of government 
spending on output and its components. …In light of these results, what is perhaps most 
surprising is the apparent confidence that inspires policymakers – and many economists – when 
evaluating and proposing fiscal policy measures.” 
5.  An empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of selected fiscal 
stimulus measures in the euro area 
Our criticism of the accepted classical theory of economics has consisted not 
so much in finding logical flaws in its analysis as in pointing out that its tacit 
assumptions are seldom or never satisfied, with the result that it cannot solve 
the economic problems of the actual world. 
John Maynard Keynes (1936) 
In this section, we present results from simulations carried out with the Federal Planning 
Bureau’s world macroeconometric model with a view to testing the effects of various fiscal 
stimulus measures in the euro area. 
Notwithstanding the controversies surrounding the effectiveness of fiscal policy and the diverse 
results of numerous kinds of models functioning under complex and varied assumptions, it is 
still useful in terms of policy discussion and implementation to have at least tentative 
evaluations of policy options. In view of this, a choice of tools is necessary. In the evaluation 
that is presented below of the currently planned fiscal-stabilisation packages of various national 
governments, results are produced using the Federal Planning Bureau’s NIME model. NIME is 
a relatively standard macroeconometric model of the world economy, which is demand-driven 
in the short run but fully supply side-determined in the long run (Meyermans and Van 
Brusselen, 2001). Grounded in Paul A. Samuelson’s “neoclassical synthesis” tradition of 
macroeconomics, the model is a straightforward macroeconometric model, dispensing with the 
raft of strong assumptions (e.g. perfect foresight, rational expectations, complete and efficient 
markets) that are commonly found in both real business cycle (RBC) and DSGE models 
grounded in New Classical and New Keynesian macroeconomics (Buiter, 2009a; Krugman, 
1998a). 
5.1  Evaluation of various economic stimulus measures 
The European Commission’s European economic recovery plan (European Commission, 2008) 
of 26 November 2008 called for the swift implementation of a public spending increase and tax 
reduction programme in order to mitigate the effects of the current economic downturn on 
European output and employment. Various possible policy options could be chosen from a 
‘menu’, and consist of either aid for enterprise investments (e.g. through direct aid and loan 
guarantees), other public works programmes, tax cuts aimed at boosting consumption 
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Given the stated desire to obtain the greatest possible effect of the fiscal measures on the euro 
area’s output and employment, it is important to have an idea as to the relative potency of the 
various stimulus options. The potential macroeconomic effects of the different types of 
measures available in this open menu were analysed using the Federal Planning Bureau’s NIME 
model. 
All of the evaluations were carried out by calibrating the magnitude of the measure so that it 
would correspond to a temporary increase in net public spending equal to 1% of the euro area 
GDP of 2008 (estimated at €92.1 billion), solely implemented in the euro area and entirely done 
so in 2009. Public income and expenditure schedules were assumed to revert to ‘business as 
usual’ in terms of their evolution (but not in terms of levels) as of 2010. 
Four types of fiscal stimulus policies were evaluated: 
1)  an increase in the public consumption of goods and services; 
2)  an increase in subsidies targeting enterprise-sector investment; 
3)  a reduction in social security contributions; and 
4)  a reduction in indirect taxation. 
All of the variants were run under the assumptions that the net increase in public spending was 
debt-financed, that this net increase in government outlays was monetised by the ECB (i.e. 
accommodated through standard open-market operations that allow for an increase in the money 
base) and that it would not lead to an on-impact (in 2009) rise in market interest rates through 
the crowding-out of private-sector investment plans. The euro area’s monetary policy was left 
free to operate over the remaining 2010–15 period, however, following the usual Taylor-type 
rule in which policy interest rates drive the short-term market interest rate in reaction to the 
area’s output gap and to the deviation of actual inflation from the monetary authorities’ target 
rate of inflation. 
In these simulations, households determine their consumption expenditure in a “permanent 
income/life cycle hypothesis” framework, where current consumption is a function of, for 
example, liquidity constraints on current household disposable income and of expected future 
income (Meyermans and Van Brusselen, 2001). Furthermore, while the model can be run under 
the constraint of a long-term fiscal solvency rule, this rule was not implemented in the 
simulation of the fiscal stimulus measures. The four policy variants were simulated for up to 
five years after the initial implementation of the shocks, to allow for an evaluation of both their 
respective short- and medium-term effects. 
5.2  Summary analyses of the four variants 
5.2.1  Effects of an increase in government consumption 
This variant is identified in Tables 8 to 12 in section 5.3 using the label ‘GC’ for government 
consumption. The variant consists of a €92 billion increase in government consumption of 
goods and services in 2009, compared with the baseline level. The measure simulated is a one-
year level increase: the level of government consumption is raised significantly in 2009, without 
any matching reduction in levels in the following years. 
In 2009, the variant leads to a 9.8% increase in real public spending relative to the baseline. 
Real GDP increases by 1%, while real private consumption rises by 0.3%. Employment rises by 
0.18% (i.e. about 265,000 new jobs). The measure deteriorates the euro area’s net budgetary 
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GDP gradually falls back towards the baseline level. Real GDP is just 0.25% above the baseline 
in 2014, while real private consumption falls 0.25% below the baseline in 2014. The net 
budgetary position continues to worsen, falling to 1.2 p.p. below the baseline in 2014. 
Consumer price inflation rises to 0.27 p.p. above the baseline in 2011 and then declines. 
Over the medium run, the initial positive impact on real output and employment is gradually 
eroded. Indeed, consumer prices rise throughout the simulation period, even though the inflation 
rate tends to fall back gradually towards its baseline level as unemployment rises above the 
baseline. Private-sector unit labour costs, which are initially reduced, tend to rise slowly back 
towards their baseline level. The rise in domestic prices is accompanied by a nominal effective 
appreciation of the euro, leading to regular losses of export volumes and increases in the area’s 
current account deficit. 
5.2.2  Effects of an increase in government-subsidised private investment 
This variant is identified in Tables 8 to 12 by the label ‘IP’ for investment by the private sector. 
The variant consists of a €92 billion increase in government subsidies granted for private sector 
investment in 2009 compared with the baseline level. This could be seen as the public sector 
deciding on a public works programme and paying private sector firms to carry out the 
investment plan. The measure that is simulated corresponds to a one-year level increase in 
private sector investment: the level of private sector investment is raised significantly in 2009 
but this rise is not followed by any matching reduction in the level in later years. 
In 2009, the variant leads to a 7.0% increase in real private-sector investment relative to the 
baseline. Real GDP increases by 1.2%, while real private consumption rises by 0.8%. 
Employment grows by 0.25% (i.e. about 357,000 new jobs). The measure deteriorates the euro 
area’s net budgetary position (as a percentage of euro area GDP) by about 0.5 percentage points. 
After 2009, real GDP declines gradually, ending up below the baseline level in the medium 
term. Real GDP falls -0.2% below the baseline level in 2014, while real private consumption 
falls -0.9% below the baseline in 2014. The net budgetary position continues to worsen, 
reducing to 1.0 p.p. below the baseline in 2014. Consumer price inflation drops on impact by 
0.44 p.p., rises to 0.49 p.p. above the baseline in 2010 and subsequently declines to just 0.09 
p.p. above the baseline rate by 2014. 
Over the medium term, the initial positive impact on real output and employment gradually 
diminishes. There is a rise in consumer prices throughout the simulation period, despite the 
gradual fall in the inflation rate towards its baseline level as unemployment surges above the 
baseline. After an initial decline, private-sector unit labour costs also tend to creep back towards 
their baseline level. Alongside the growth in domestic prices is a nominal effective appreciation 
of the euro, leading to regular losses of export volumes and increases in the area’s current 
account deficit. 
5.2.3  Effects of a reduction in social security contributions 
This variant is identified in Tables 8 to 12 by the label ‘SS’ for social security contributions. 
The variant consists of a reduction in the model’s implicit macroeconomic rate of social security 
contributions, allowing for an ex ante €92 billion decline in social contributions in 2009 
compared with the baseline level. The simulated measure corresponds to a one-year level 
decline in the rate of social contributions: the social contributions rate is reduced in 2009 but 
this reduction is not followed by any matching hike in its level in subsequent years. 
In 2009, the variant leads to a 0.7% increase in real GDP, while real private consumption rises 
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euro area’s net budgetary position (as a percentage of euro area GDP) by about 0.7 percentage 
points. After 2009, real GDP gradually falls, reaching just 0.2% above the baseline by 2014. 
Real private consumption holds up, reaching 1.0% above the baseline in 2014. Employment 
progressively declines and falls to 0.06% below the baseline in 2014. The net budgetary position 
continues to worsen, falling to 1.0 p.p. below the baseline in 2014. Consumer price inflation 
rises to 0.19 p.p. above the baseline in 2011 but subsequently declines to just 0.15 p.p. above the 
baseline rate by 2014. 
Over the medium term, the initial positive impact on real output and employment deteriorates, 
although household incomes and consumption benefit from a more persistent boost. Consumer 
prices rise throughout the simulation period, even though the inflation rate tends to fall back 
gradually towards its baseline level as unemployment slowly rises above the baseline. Private-
sector unit labour costs, which fall sharply at first, give up a large part of their initial reduction. 
The rise in domestic prices is accompanied by a nominal effective appreciation of the euro, 
leading to regular losses of export volumes and increases in the area’s current account deficit. 
5.2.4  Effects of a reduction in indirect taxation 
This variant is identified in Tables 8 to 12 by the label ‘IT’ for indirect taxation. The variant 
consists of a reduction in the NIME model’s implicit macroeconomic rate of indirect taxation, 
allowing for an ex ante €92 billion decline in indirect tax receipts in 2009, compared with the 
baseline level. The simulated measure corresponds to a one-year level decline in the implicit 
indirect tax rate: the implicit indirect tax rate is reduced in 2009 but this reduction is not 
followed by any matching hike in its level in subsequent years. 
In 2009, the variant leads to a 0.3% increase in real GDP, while real private consumption rises 
by 0.6% and employment by 0.10% (i.e. about 143,000 new jobs). The measure deteriorates the 
euro area’s net budgetary position (as a percentage of euro area GDP) by about 0.7 percentage 
points. After 2009, real GDP immediately falls below the baseline, reaching 0.3% below the 
baseline in 2014. Real private consumption also declines, reaching 0.7% below the baseline in 
2014. Employment gradually falls to 0.06% below the baseline in 2014. The net budgetary 
position continues to worsen, falling to 1.0 p.p. below the baseline in 2014. Consumer price 
inflation reduces on impact by 0.45 p.p., rises to 0.30 p.p. above the baseline in 2010 and 
subsequently declines to 0.03 p.p. below the baseline in 2014. 
The initial positive but limited impact on real output is lost as of the year following the 
implementation of the indirect tax cut. The initial employment gains are gradually eroded over 
the medium run. There are steep falls in consumer prices on impact but prices return to the 
baseline after three years. The measure reduces real private-sector wage costs and unit labour 
costs. Unemployment declines initially but rises above the baseline in the medium term. After 
an initial effective appreciation of the euro, the area’s currency steadily depreciates over the 
medium term. The gradual decrease in real domestic demand and the effective currency 
depreciation lead to a significant drop in import volumes and a parallel increase in exports, 
which limit the deterioration of the area’s current account to GDP ratio. 
5.3  Comparison of the simulation results for the various stimulus 
options 
In this section, we highlight the main effects of the above four fiscal stimulus variants on the 
euro area economy in terms of impacts on GDP, employment level, inflation rate and the euro 
area’s consolidated fiscal position as a percentage of GDP, as well as the area’s current account 
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Table 8 shows that on impact (in 2009), an increase in government-financed investment projects 
(IP) produces the greatest rise in euro area GDP. Cuts in indirect taxes (IT) produce the smallest 
effect. Generally, we observe that public spending increases have greater effects than reductions 
in taxation. But reductions in labour costs through cuts in social contributions (SS) tend to have 
relatively positive and persistent effects on output. 
Table 9 indicates that on impact, an increase in government-financed investment (IP) produces 
the greatest rise in euro area employment. Cuts in indirect taxes (IT) produce the smallest short-
term effect. All of the stimulus measures lead to employment falling below the baseline level in 
the long run, but the long-term decline is smallest in the case of reductions in social 
contributions (SS). 
Table 10 shows that by the second year of implementation, an increase in government-financed 
investment projects (IP) produces the greatest rise in euro area inflation, pushing the inflation 
rate above the baseline rate by 0.49 percentage points. Cuts in indirect taxes (IT) produce only a 
modest uptick in short-term inflation, but lead to a decline in inflation in the long run. 
Table 11 reveals that all of the fiscal stimulus measures lead to a persistent deterioration in the 
consolidated, government fiscal position of the euro area. The short-term impact is smallest in 
the case of an increase in government-financed investment projects (IP), and is largest in the 
case of an increase in government consumption of goods and services. 
Table 12 shows that all of the fiscal stimulus measures lead to a deterioration in the euro area’s 
current account balance. In the short run, the effect is largest in the case of an increase in 
government-financed investment projects (IP) and is smallest in the case of a cut in indirect 
taxes (IT). Increased government consumption (GC) leads to steeper declines, while the 
reductions brought about by cuts in indirect taxes (IT) disappear in the longer run. 
Table 8. Impacts on real GDP (deviation from the baseline, in %)  
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
GDPO_GC  1.0 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 
GDPO_IP  1.2 0.6 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 
GDPO_SS  0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 
GDPO_IT  0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 
Source: NIME model, Belgian Federal Planning Bureau. 
Table 9. Impacts on employment (deviation from the baseline, in %)  
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
N_GC  0.18 0.16 0.09 -0.01 -0.08 -0.11 
N_IP  0.25 0.25 0.14 0.01 -0.10 -0.17 
N_SS  0.15 0.24 0.22 0.13 0.02 -0.06 
N_IT  0.10 0.13 0.10 0.04 -0.01 -0.06 
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Table 10. Impacts on the inflation rate (deviation from the baseline, in p.p.)  
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
PCHR_GC  0.01 0.23 0.27 0.25 0.22 0.19 
PCHR_IP  -0.44 0.49 0.35 0.23 0.15 0.09 
PCHR_SS  0.01 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.15 
PCHR_IT  -0.45 0.30 0.14 0.04 0.00 -0.03 
Source: NIME model, Belgian Federal Planning Bureau. 
Table 11. Impacts on the net lending position of (consolidated) government in the euro area 
(deviation from the baseline, in p.p. of GDP)  
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
NLGR_GC  -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -1.1 -1.1 -1.2 
NLGR_IP  -0.5 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0 -1.0 
NLGR_SS  -0.7 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 -1.0 
NLGR_IT  -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 -1.0 -1.0 
Source: NIME model, Belgian Federal Planning Bureau. 
Table 12. Impacts on the current account position (deviation from the baseline, in p.p. of GDP)  
 2009 2010  2011 2012 2013 2014 
CAR_GC  -0.22 -0.19 -0.25 -0.35 -0.44 -0.53 
CAR_IP  -0.30 -0.31 -0.32 -0.38 -0.42 -0.43 
CAR_SS  -0.15 -0.15 -0.19 -0.26 -0.33 -0.39 
CAR_IT  -0.11 -0.16 -0.13 -0.13 -0.11 -0.07 
Source: NIME model, Belgian Federal Planning Bureau. 
5.4  Fiscal policy effectiveness: Aligning policy objectives with 
instruments 
Table 13 allows for a comparison of the four fiscal stimulus variants that were simulated for the 
euro area with the NIME model, indicating with an ‘X’ those instruments that appear to be the 
most effective in relation to selected policy objectives. The instruments are evaluated with 
respect to both their short-term (ST) and medium-term (MT) impacts. 
The European EcoFin Council of 2 December 2008 reaffirmed the view that a European-wide 
economic stimulus plan should aim at maximising its short-term effect on real GDP (Council of 
the European Union, 2008). 
Table 13 indicates that if a government’s objective is indeed to maximise the short-term impact 
of its stimulus package on real GDP, then the optimal policy instrument should consist of a 
government-financed increase in private sector investment. In the medium term, however, it is 
an increase in government consumption of goods and services that would provide the greatest 
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Table 13. Policy objectives and instrument optimality  
  
GDP 
 
Employment
 
Inflation 
Fiscal 
balance 
External 
balance 
  ST MT  ST  MT  ST MT ST MT ST MT 
Increased public 
consumption    X            
Public-financed 
investment  X   X       X  X    
Social  contributions  cuts       X  X  X      
Indirect  tax  cuts              X  X 
Note: ‘X’ identifies the variant exhibiting the best relative performance in relation to each specific objective. 
Source: Author's compilation. 
If the objective were to maximise the short-term impact of the measures on employment, then 
the optimal policy would consist of an increase in government subsidies to private sector 
investment. 
All four policy variants simulated with the NIME model exhibit similar negative effects on the 
consolidated net budgetary position of the euro area. Government subsidies aimed at increasing 
private sector investment would lead to only marginally less negative results. 
All of the policy variants that were tested also generate negative effects on the euro area’s 
consolidated current account position. Higher public investment produces the largest initial 
deterioration in the area’s external account, but increased government consumption of goods 
and services appears to have a somewhat more negative long-term impact. Cuts in indirect taxes 
also lead to a deterioration in the euro area’s current account balance, but these negative short-
term effects are more limited than for the three other variants. Furthermore, these negative 
effects tend to dissipate in the long run. 
6.  Potential effects of a euro area-wide economic recovery plan 
This section presents a tentative evaluation of the size of the national recovery plans put forward 
by individual EU governments in the wake of the European Commission’s recovery plan 
proposal. The macroeconomic effects of the effective implementation of these plans have been 
evaluated with the NIME model. The main effects of the implied recovery plan for the euro area 
and of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 for the US are presented in terms 
of deviations from a baseline scenario that does not include these measures. 
5.5  The European economic recovery plan 
In its European economic recovery plan  of 26 November 2008, the European Commission 
called for the swift implementation of a public spending or tax cut programme (or both) of 
roughly 1.5% of the EU’s GDP (European Commission, 2008). This would come in the form of 
various channels of aid for business investments (e.g. through direct aid and loan guarantees), 
other public works programmes, tax cuts aimed at boosting consumption expenditure and cuts in 
social security contributions to stimulate labour demand. The recovery plans could allow EU 
member states to engage in temporary fiscal stabilisation (deficit spending) and increase their 
budget deficits without violating the terms of the EU’s revised stability and growth pact. More 
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temporary and limited budget deficits
3 as long as their medium-term, cyclically-adjusted 
budgetary position is projected to return to balance or surplus. 
Even though the EcoFin Council of 2 December 2008 approved the Commission’s proposed 
recovery plan, it still seems unlikely that the Commission’s proposal of an EU-wide, fiscal 
stimulus package of 1.5% of GDP overall will be implemented in full. Indeed, by late February 
2009, the sum of fiscal stimulus (public spending and tax cut) measures put forward by EU 
governments was estimated to have reached €106 billion at the level of the 27 EU member 
states (Saha and von Weisäcker, 2009). If one adds to this figure the €263.8 billion in measures 
put forward in the form of government loan and credit guarantees for non-financial enterprises, 
one comes up with a total EU-wide commitment of €369.8 billion. For the euro area
4 (euro-12), 
direct fiscal measures are estimated to total €73 billion. Additional credit and loan guarantees to 
non-financial corporates could provide another €169.9 billion, leading to a grand total of €271.6 
billion or 3% of the estimated nominal GDP of 2008 at the euro-12 level. 
6.1  The macroeconomic effects of fiscal stabilisation plans in the 
euro area 
Although the total figure of €369.8 billion budgeted in the framework of the economic recovery 
plans of the 27 EU member states is impressive, a large share of this sum consists of credit and 
loan guarantees extended by national governments to the non-financial corporate sector. These 
guarantees and credit lines constitute large contingent liabilities for governments; however, a 
figure for an effective fiscal stimulus that includes this support most likely overestimates the 
true impact of the stimulus plans in terms of their potential effects on real economic output and 
employment (Rodrik, 2009; Truman, 2009). 
In view of assessing the potential real output effects of these plans, we assume that the effective 
stimulus will consist of the fiscal spending and tax cut measures announced, to which we add 
half of the amount budgeted under the heading of credit lines and loan guarantees to the non-
financial business sector. For the euro-12 area, this would produce a total effective economic 
stimulus package of €157.9 billion, representing 1.7% of the euro-12’s nominal GDP of 2008. 
Automatic fiscal stabilisers will of course also provide significant boosts to growth. Even so, 
these endogenous impulses will not be the object of the evaluation of fiscal packages. As Table 
14 shows, the role of automatic fiscal stabilisers is often important, sometimes providing 
support to the economy that is equal to or greater than that of the discretionary impulses. Given 
the size of the support provided by the automatic stabilisers and the limited ‘fiscal space’ they 
have, governments in some EU member states have concluded that implementing large 
discretionary fiscal stabilisation plans would pose too great a risk to the longer-term 
sustainability of their fiscal balance (IMF, 2009b). 
Table 14 shows that while the US may have put in place a fiscal stimulus package that is 
significantly larger than the aggregate fiscal stimulus plan of the major euro-area countries, the 
latter countries have allowed for a substantial counter-cyclical stimulus from their automatic 
fiscal stabilisers. This latter approach can be viewed as an explanation (or compensation) for the 
more modest efforts geared towards large, discretionary, fiscal stabilisation packages. 
                                                      
3 See Article 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1056/2005 on exceptional excessive deficits. 
4 The ‘euro area’ in the NIME model comprises the following 12 countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
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Table 14. Effects of automatic fiscal stabilisers on the fiscal balance (average annual change in 
2008–10 compared with 2007, in % of GDP)  
  Change in the overall fiscal 
balance due to a change in 
automatic fiscal stabilisers 
Change in the overall fiscal 
balance due to a change in 
discretionary measures 
France  -2.4 -0.4 
Germany  -1.6 -1.1 
Italy  -2.6 -0.1 
Japan  -2.2 -0.7 
UK  -2.5 -0.5 
US  -1.6 -1.6 
Source: IMF (2009a). 
In evaluating the macroeconomic effects of the euro-area economic recovery package, we 
assume the presence of both inside and outside implementation lags, leading to a spend-out 
schedule in which half of the package impacts the euro-12 economy in 2009 and the remaining 
half does so in 2010. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the entire increase in public 
spending comes in the form of increased consumption of goods and services and that the 
reductions in taxes take the form of temporarily lower taxes on labour income. In both cases, we 
opt for policy measures that are associated with what can be viewed as relatively high short-
term multiplier effects; the simulation thus arguably provides an upper bound on the 
macroeconomic effects that can be expected from the NIME model for the euro-12 economic 
stabilisation plans. 
Finally, the recovery plans are simulated using a baseline projection that corresponds to a 
projection of the world economy in the current economic environment. This allows the 
macroeconomic effects of the stimulus plan to capture possible state-dependent effects from 
prevailing low inflation, low – but still positive – nominal short-term interest rates, rising 
unemployment and rising household saving rates in the euro-12 area. 
The main macroeconomic effects of the euro-area fiscal stabilisation plan are presented in Table 
15. In the first year of its implementation, the plan would raise euro-12 GDP by 0.77% with 
respect to the baseline. The initial effect of the euro-12 recovery plan would be to increase 
private sector output, creating about 200,000 jobs in response to the rise in public consumption. 
The ensuing rise in household income then goes on to raise private consumption expenditure. 
The second half of the stimulus package affects the economy in 2010, raising GDP by 0.62%. 
This lesser impact stems from a number of factors. First, the somewhat higher inflation reduces 
the size of the real amount of stimulus in 2010. Second, a larger part of the stimulus package 
leaks out in the form of higher real imports, which produce a deterioration in the area’s current 
account balance. Finally, the fiscal stimulus leads to a slight increase in nominal interest rates as 
the area’s negative output gap is reduced and as inflation picks up. 
Over the period 2011–15, the effects of the stimulus package on output decline and real GDP 
gradually falls back towards its baseline level. As of 2012, higher inflation, higher interest rates 
and import leakages reverse the initial employment gains. The area’s fiscal position deteriorates 
by a full percentage point of GDP while the area’s current account deteriorates by 0.58 p.p. of 
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Table 15. Main effects of the euro-area economic recovery plan (deviations from the baseline 
level in %, except where otherwise noted)  
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013  2014  2015
Real GDP   0.77 0.62 0.45 0.31 0.19  0.11  0.06
Real private consumption  0.23 0.18 0.10 0.05 0.00  -0.04  -0.08
Employment 0.14 0.11 0.06 -0.02 -0.07  -0.10  -0.10
Employment  
(difference, in thousands of persons)  200 163 84 -25 -107 -150 -149
Consumer price inflation rate 
(difference, in p.p.)  0.00 0.22 0.50 0.76 0.99 1.19 1.35
Nominal short-term interest rate 
(difference, in p.p. of GDP)  0.17 0.34 0.44 0.47 0.44 0.39 0.33
Nominal effective exchange rate  -0.20 -0.58 -1.00 -1.49 -1.90  -2.18  -2.35
Fiscal position 
(difference, in p.p. of GDP)  -0.60 -0.67 -0.75 -0.85 -0.92 -0.98 -1.03
Current account position 
(difference, in p.p. of GDP)  -0.19 -0.21 -0.28 -0.37 -0.46 -0.53 -0.58
Notes: No international fiscal policy coordination: the fiscal stimulus is simulated solely for the euro-12 area. 
Short-term interest rates are endogenously determined by a Taylor-type rule. 
Exchange rates are endogenously determined by an uncovered interest parity condition; a minus (-) sign indicates 
currency appreciation. 
No long-term fiscal solvency rule is imposed. 
Source: NIME model, Belgian Federal Planning Bureau. 
6.2  Alternative evaluations of the euro-area fiscal stimulus plan 
To date, unfortunately, few alternative evaluations of the fiscal packages of EU countries have 
been made public. There are a number of evaluations of the budgetary size of the government 
fiscal and financial plans announced, but usually without an evaluation of the macroeconomic 
effects of these packages. 
There is an initial difficulty associated with obtaining a reasonable evaluation of the effective 
size of a package, as a percentage of GDP. This is problematic because many of the national 
stabilisation plans bundle tax, public spending and contingent, “below-the-line” financial market 
measures (Rodrik, 2009; Truman, 2009). A second difficulty lies in the evaluation of the direct 
and indirect effects of the ‘true’ economic stimulus measures on the various economies. 
The European Commission has proposed guidelines for a potential, coordinated, EU-wide fiscal 
stabilisation plan. But the Commission has not proposed a macroeconomic assessment of the 
national plans that have been announced in this framework. 
An analysis that provides a comparison for the NIME results was published by the IMF in 
preparation for the London meeting of the Group of 20 on 2 April 2009 (IMF, 2009b). The 
IMF’s study is based on a fiscal-multiplier approach and it makes use of the national economic 
recovery plans that had been announced and made available in late January 2009. It indicates 
that the euro-12 stimulus packages contain provisions for fiscal boosts equivalent to 0.90% of 
euro-12 GDP for 2009 and 0.76% of euro-12 GDP for 2010. These plans are expected to 
effectively raise euro area GDP by 0.26% to 0.74% in 2009 and by 0.05% to 0.33% in 2010 
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Table 16. An IMF evaluation of the GDP effects of euro-area stimulus plans 
 2009 2010 
Real GDP level: Low estimate (% change from the baseline)  0.26 0.05 
Real GDP level: High estimate (% change from the baseline)  0.74 0.33 
Note: GDP-weighted average of results for France, Germany, Italy and Spain. 
Source: Own computations based on IMF data.  
The overall size of the fiscal packages that were evaluated in the IMF and NIME analyses are 
quite similar; the results are also relatively close, as the NIME analysis estimates that the fiscal 
measures will raise euro-12 GDP by about 0.77% in 2009 and by 0.62% in 2010. 
In another IMF publication (Freedman et al., 2009), the size of the euro-area fiscal stimulus 
package is estimated at 0.9% of GDP in 2009 and at 0.8% of GDP in 2010. This is roughly 
equal to the stimulus package that was simulated with the Federal Planning Bureau’s NIME 
model. The measures affecting the economy in 2009 would lead to a rise in the level of euro-
area real GDP of 0.5% relative to a ‘no stimulus’ scenario; the measures affecting 2010 would 
raise the level of euro-area real GDP by 0.3% relative to a ‘no stimulus’ baseline. These results 
are significantly smaller than those produced with the NIME model. 
7.  Potential effects of the US economic recovery plan 
This section first presents the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. The 
macroeconomic effects of the implementation of this stimulus plan were evaluated with the 
NIME model. The model results are presented in terms of deviations from a baseline scenario 
that does not include the plan’s public spending or tax cuts. 
7.1  The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
Only days after taking office, President Barack Obama’s new administration drafted an 
economic stimulus plan that, it was hoped, would limit the scale of the recession the US had 
tipped into in December 2007. A large fiscal stimulus plan, the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 (Public Law 111-5), was signed into law on 17 February 
2009. The ARRA called for the swift implementation of a public spending and tax cuts 
programme that would inject a net $787 billion into the country’s economy, which corresponds 
to 5.52% of the estimated US GDP of 2008. 
The ARRA devotes $288 billion (37% of the total package) to tax cuts, with the rest of the fiscal 
measures coming in the form of higher public spending. The package aims at boosting public 
spending on infrastructure, education, health, investment in energy efficiency and on block 
grants for state and local fiscal relief. It also contains tax cuts designed to raise consumption 
expenditure and cuts in payroll taxes to stimulate labour demand. The implementation of the 
ARRA will span the period 2009–19, but the brunt of the measures (about 90% of the package) 
is set to affect the economy over the period 2009–11. 
7.2  The macroeconomic effects of fiscal stabilisation plans in the US 
The main macroeconomic effects of the US fiscal stabilisation plan are presented in Table 17. 
By the end of 2009, the ARRA will have provided a net ex ante fiscal boost of about $185 
billion, raising US GDP by 1.16% for the year relative to the baseline level. The initial effect of 
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response to the rise in public consumption and to the tax cuts. The ensuing rise in household 
income would then raise private consumption expenditure. 
Table 17. Main effects of the US economic recovery plan (deviations from the baseline level in 
%, except where otherwise noted)  
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real GDP   1.16 2.25 0.08 -0.90 -0.97  -0.65  -0.29
Real private consumption  0.68 1.51 -0.33 -0.99 -1.17  -0.87  -0.32
Employment 0.30 0.54 -0.06 -0.38 -0.46  -0.33  -0.14
Employment  
(difference, in thousands of persons)  454  809  -93 -585 -708 -514 -225 
Consumer price inflation rate 
(difference, in p.p.)  -0.01 0.16 0.74 1.24 1.49 1.48 1.34
Nominal short-term interest rate 
(difference, in p.p. of GDP)  0.29 0.81 0.77 0.46 0.14 -0.09 -0.19
Nominal effective exchange rate  -0.29 -1.44 -2.15 -2.37 -2.08  -1.83  -1.70
Fiscal position 
(difference, in p.p. of GDP)  -0.82 -1.87 -1.03 -0.72 -0.67 -0.53 -0.30
Current account position 
(difference, in p.p. of GDP)  -0.18 -0.38 -0.21 -0.20 -0.22 -0.23 -0.26
Notes: No international fiscal policy coordination: the fiscal stimulus is simulated solely for the US. 
Short-term interest rates are endogenously determined by a Taylor-type rule. 
Exchange rates are endogenously determined by an uncovered interest parity condition; a minus (-) sign 
indicates currency appreciation. 
No long-term fiscal solvency rule is imposed. 
Source: NIME model, Belgian Federal Planning Bureau. 
Another very significant portion of the US stimulus plan is expected to affect the US economy 
in 2010, boosting GDP for the year by 2.25% relative to the baseline. This massive impact is 
due to the scale of the measures that will take effect in 2010. Indeed, these measures represent a 
net injection of about $399 billion into the economy in 2010, which is about 51% of the entire 
stimulus package. Part of the stimulus leaks out of the US economy in the form of increased 
imports, which produces a deterioration in the country’s current account position. The size of 
the stimulus also tends to be somewhat reduced by an ‘inflation leakage’, as higher prices will 
reduce the real size of the fiscal boost. Finally, the fiscal stimulus will lead to a noticeable 
uptick in nominal interest rates as the US economy’s negative output gap diminishes and as 
inflation tends to pick up. 
In 2011, the US economy is set to receive another net injection of $134 billion. GDP is 
projected to rise by no more than 0.08% above the baseline level, as real private-consumption 
expenditure will be curtailed by both higher prices and nominal interest rates, and as cheaper 
imports will raise real import volumes, thereby deteriorating the current account position in the 
US. 
Over the remaining period 2012–15, the effects of the stimulus package are expected to push 
real GDP down below the baseline level. The initial employment gains will give way to net job 
losses owing to higher prices, higher nominal interest rates and increased imports. The initial 
jump in prices will be gradually reversed but inflation will fall back towards the baseline levels 32 | PATRICK VAN BRUSSELEN 
only slowly. US nominal short-term interest rates will also fall back and eventually undershoot 
the baseline level because of the decline in real GDP relative to the baseline. The nominal 
effective exchange rate of the US will exhibit some stickiness, returning towards the baseline 
only slowly. The country’s fiscal position will deteriorate by a maximum of 1.9 p.p. of GDP in 
2010 but the fiscal shortfall will then decline in line with the rapid reduction in the size of the 
net fiscal boosts after 2011. The country’s current account position will deteriorate by 0.38 p.p. 
of GDP in 2010 and the adverse trade effects will continue to develop through 2015. 
7.3  What do alternative evaluations of the US fiscal stimulus plan 
indicate? 
The US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) evaluated the potential macroeconomic effects of 
the ARRA in March 2009 (Elmendorf, 2009a). The assessment of the short-term 
macroeconomic effects is based on the timetable of the anticipated spend-out of the public 
spending measures and on the year in which the tax changes are estimated to affect income. 
Using a detailed series of spending and tax-cut multiplier estimates, the CBO evaluated the GDP 
and employment effects of the measures adopted in the ARRA. The values of the various 
multipliers are wide-ranging, going from a high estimate of 2.5 for government spending on 
goods and services, to a low estimate of zero for tax cuts affecting business cash flows. The 
long-term effects depend on the impacts of the measures on the determinants of long-term US 
economic growth, i.e. the capital stock, the labour supply and productivity. 
The CBO’s evaluation reveals that the ARRA could increase US GDP by anywhere between 
1.4% and 3.8% relative to a baseline level (in 4Q/4Q terms) by the end of 2009, by between 
1.1% and 3.4% in 2010 and by between 0.4% and 1.2% in 2011 (Table 18). 
Table 18. The CBO’s evaluation of the macroeconomic effects of the ARRA  
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013  2014  2015
Real GDP level: Low estimate  
(% change from the baseline) 
1.4 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0  -0.1
Real GDP level: High estimate  
(% change from the baseline) 
3.8 3.4 1.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1
Employment: Low estimate 
(difference from the baseline,  
millions of jobs) 
0.8 1.2 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1
Employment: High estimate 
(difference from the baseline,  
millions of jobs) 
2.3 3.6 1.8 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.1
Source: Elmendorf (2009a). 
Another evaluation of the US fiscal stimulus plan also finds significant positive effects from 
public spending and tax cuts (Leduc, 2009). Using a set of fiscal multipliers estimated by a 
private forecasting firm, a fiscal stimulus plan of measures worth $816 billion was estimated to 
raise the US GDP growth rate by 1.2 p.p. in 2009 (in 4Q/4Q terms) and by 0.7 p.p. in 2010. 
Both of these alternative evaluations of the ARRA were carried out using estimated fiscal 
multipliers. The two multiplier-based studies indicate that there is great uncertainty surrounding 
the results. Both studies indicate clear, positive, short-term effects on real GDP, but the size of 
these effects on the level of real GDP in 2009 range from +1.2% to +3.8%, while the effects on 
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The IMF’s own multiplier-based analysis (IMF, 2009a) indicates that the US stimulus package 
amounts to fiscal boosts of about 2.0% of GDP in 2009 and 1.8% of GDP in 2010. This plan 
could increase US GDP by between 0.6% and 1.4% in 2009 and by between 0.4% and 1.2% of 
GDP in 2010 (IMF, 2009b) (Table 19). 
Table 19. An IMF evaluation of the GDP effects of the US stimulus plan  
 2009 2010 
Real GDP level: Low estimate (% change from the baseline)  0.6 0.4 
Real GDP level: High estimate (% change from the baseline)  1.4 1.2 
Source: IMF (2009b). 
Further comparison of these results, e.g. with the results from a macroeconometric model such 
as NIME, are not easy because of fundamental differences in the methodological approaches. 
That being stated, it appears that the macroeconometric model results are identical in terms of 
whether the effects on real GDP are positive or negative, while clearly lying on the lower bound 
of the range of effects on GDP that are presented in the multiplier analyses. 
In another IMF study (Freedman et al., 2009), the size of the US fiscal stimulus package was 
estimated at 1.9% of GDP in 2009 and at 2.9% of GDP in 2010. This is equal to the stimulus 
package that was simulated with the Federal Planning Bureau’s NIME model. The IMF study 
finds that the measures affecting the economy in 2009 would lead to a rise in the level of US 
real GDP of 1.3% relative to a ‘no stimulus’ scenario. The measures affecting 2010 would raise 
the level of US real GDP by 2.7% relative to a ‘no stimulus’ baseline. These results are slightly 
greater than are those produced with NIME (1.2% in 2009 and 2.3% in 2010). 
8.  Where is the world economy headed? Insights from a model-based 
medium-term projection 
In this section, a tentative projection for the world economy is proposed for the period 2009–15. 
Although there are an unusually high number of risks and uncertainties surrounding the 
unwinding of the global financial and economic crises, the NIME model is used to project a 
baseline scenario for the world economy over the coming years, conditional to a number of 
technical assumptions. As noted earlier, NIME is a macroeconometric model grounded in the 
neoclassical synthesis tradition, with microeconomic foundations for consumption and 
investment decisions, short-term wage and price stickiness and a long-term ‘steady-state’ 
equilibrium. The projection indicates that although fiscal stimulus plans will undoubtedly 
provide a temporary boost to world output, they will also most likely prove to be insufficient to 
prevent a sharp decline in real GDP growth rates and will not allow the major economies of the 
world to escape falling into a period of dangerously low rates of inflation. 
8.1  Assumptions underlying the model and projection exercise 
The version of the NIME model that was used to produce the projection presented in Table 20 
(in section 8.2 below) was estimated using historical annual data covering the period 1970–
2007. The core data set comes from the European Commission’s AMECO database of October 
2008. The sample period used for estimating the model parameters implies that parameter 
estimates affecting the short-term dynamics of crucial behavioural equations such as private 
consumption, as well as the long-term equations determining the model’s ‘equilibrium’ values,  
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are affected by the strong growth in consumption and low saving behaviour of the period 2002–
07. It is nonetheless to be expected that the financial and economic crisis that unfolded in the 
summer of 2007 will have induced changes in the values of a number of crucial parameters, and 
two kinds of corrections have been made to the model to reflect these likely modifications. 
The first change that was brought into the model was the addition of an expectations term in 
consumer price equations, to reflect agents’ expectations that central banks will be able to 
maintain effective inflation in positive territory and thus allow the major economies to avoid 
falling into prolonged periods of deflation. The second modification was made to the model’s 
long-term (equilibrium) output growth estimates for the major world economies: these were 
reduced over the projection period to reflect the negative effect of the financial crisis and 
recession on capital accumulation trends, on natural rates of unemployment and on labour 
productivity growth.
5 Over the 2009–10 period, potential output growth was set to an average of 
0.9% per annum for the euro area, 1.5% per annum for the US and 0.7% per annum for Japan. 
Over the remainder of the projection horizon, potential output growth was set to an average of 
1.2% per annum for the euro area, 2.1% per annum for the US and 1.3% per annum for Japan. 
Without these changes to price expectations and to expected future potential output, the model 
would have projected significantly larger output gaps, associated with persistent and heightened 
deflationary pressures, in all of the major economies of the world. 
The results presented for 2009 are partly exogenous, reflecting information from the latest 
available forecasts from the European Commission, the OECD, the IMF, the World Bank and 
various other, private economic research and forecasting institutions. The short-term projection 
results for interest and exchange rates reflect market data (from financial and commodity futures 
markets) available up to 13 March 2009. Specifically, futures data are retained for interest rates 
and nominal exchange rates for 2009. Oil prices correspond to commodity futures data for 2009 
and 2010. As of 2010, the model’s representative short-term nominal interest rates are 
determined by Taylor-type rules, while nominal effective exchange rates are determined by 
‘uncovered interest parity’ rules. As of 2011, world oil prices are assumed to follow an index of 
world inflation, thus remaining constant in real terms. 
The cost of credit and the state of credit conditions are proxied in NIME by the level of two 
market interest rates. The representative short-term market interest rate that appears in the 
model is the 3-month Euribor rate for the euro area and the 3-month Libor eurodollar rate for 
the US. The long-term rate is approximated by the average interest rate on 10-year government 
bonds for the euro area and by the 10-year constant maturity Treasury note for the US. In the 
current financial crisis, however, it is no longer possible to view these rates as representative 
indicators of the cost and availability of credit, as access to credit has been tightened, spreads 
have risen between yields on long-term government debt and long-term corporate bonds, large 
spreads have appeared between financial and non-financial corporate bond rates, and raising 
funds on equity markets has become more difficult. In order to reflect firms’ current difficulties 
in meeting their financing requirements, an ‘exceptional capital-cost premium’ reflecting 
current risk, term and liquidity premia has been added to the values of the nominal interest rates 
that affect the model results for 2009. In all of the model’s economic areas, the exceptional 
capital-cost premium has been set at 300 basis points for the short-term cost of credit and at 450 
basis points for the long-term cost of credit. It is further assumed that financial market stress and 
opacity will disappear by the end of 2009, so that the model’s usual short- and long-term 
interest rates will once again become meaningful indicators of the cost of credit for 
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corporations. Hence, as of 2010, it is no longer necessary to add any exceptional capital-cost 
premium to the representative market interest rates generated by the model. 
The projection integrates publicly available information on the economic stimulus plans drawn 
up and implemented in both the euro-12 area and in the US. For practical reasons, no special 
consideration has been given to integrating stimulus plans from other countries of the world. In 
this respect, recent evaluations indicate that the stimulus plans announced by Japan since 2008 
would have only a very limited impact on world growth. Although the magnitude of the 
measures announced by China is considerable, the size of the Chinese economy
6 would also 
preclude its fiscal stimulus from having a significant impact on the growth rate of the world 
economy. Indeed, if China’s growth were to be a ‘robust’ 8% instead of a ‘low’ 6% in 2009, it 
would raise world GDP by a supplement of about 0.1%, which is well below measurement 
errors for aggregate world real GDP. 
Regarding the euro-12 economic recovery plan, the projection makes use of the analysis of 
national fiscal stimulus plans provided by the Bruegel think tank (Saha and von Weisäcker, 
2009). The stimulus effort that is taken into account from the Bruegel analysis is the amount 
that Bruegel calls “additional fiscal spending”, plus half of the value of what Bruegel labels as 
additional “credit and similar measures” extended to the non-financial business sector. On this 
basis, the fiscal stimulus effectively implemented in the projection exercise reaches €157.9 
billion, or 1.7% of the euro area’s GDP of 2008. The total stimulus package is assumed to be 
fully implemented, with half its effects on the EU economy expected to appear in 2009 and the 
remaining half occurring in 2010. No further stimulus measures are assumed after 2010. 
Regarding the fiscal stimulus contained in the ARRA of 2009, the projection integrates a fiscal 
stimulus of $787 billion, as proposed in the law enacted on 17 February 2009. The US stimulus 
package is assumed to be fully implemented and to affect the US economy following the spend-
out timetable that was estimated by the US Congressional Budget Office (Elmendorf, 2009a), 
which affects the US economy over the entire 2009–15 projection period. Regarding the more 
general US fiscal-policy stance, the usual assumption of unchanged policy and legislation is 
made. This implies that fiscal revenue will rise significantly over 2010–12 following the 
expiration of the cuts in individual income and estate taxes enacted in 2001 and 2003. Finally, 
with respect to the simulation of the future stance of fiscal policy, no long-term fiscal solvency 
rule is imposed in the projection exercise. 
8.2  A medium-term baseline scenario for the world economy 
This section presents a medium-term baseline scenario for the world economy. The projection is 
simulated assuming that potential output growth over the projection period is reduced compared 
with estimates of potential output growth covering the pre-August 2007 period, that current laws 
and fiscal policy measures are effectively and fully implemented, and that inflation expectations 
remain well anchored and positive, allowing central banks to counter any prolonged 
deflationary pressures. Table 20 indicates how a relatively standard macroeconometric model 
can be used to assess the medium- to long-term dynamics of the current worldwide recession. 
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Table 20. A world baseline projection for the period 2009–15 (including the fiscal stabilisation 
plans of the US and euro area)  
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Avg. 
1971 
2007 
Avg.
2009 
2015
Euro area     
1. Real gross domestic product  0.8 -3.9 -0.9 1.6 1.3 1.8 1.9 1.8 2.6 0.5
2. Deflator of private consumption  3.3 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.5 4.9 0.9
3. Unemployment rate (level, % of 
civilian labour force) 
7.6 9.9 10.6 10.6 10.1 9.3 8.5 8.0 7.7 9.6
4. Short-term interest rate (level)  4.6 1.7 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.6 1.1 7.6 0.9
5. Nominal effective exchange rate 
(+: depreciation) 
-5.9 -5.2 -2.0 -2.2 -1.6 -1.8 -2.7 -3.6 -9.4 -2.7
6. Government net lending (level, % of 
GDP) 
-1.7 -4.3 -5.5 -4.3 -4.2 -3.9 -3.7 -3.6 -3.2 -4.2
7. Current account (level, % of GDP)  -0.2 -0.8 -0.2 0.7 1.6 2.3 2.8 3.1 0.1 1.4
      
US     
1. Real gross domestic product  1.1 -4.1 -0.0 -0.6 0.3 2.4 2.9 2.9 3.1 0.5
2. Deflator of private consumption  3.3 -0.4 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 4.1 0.6
3. Unemployment rate (level, % of 
civilian labour force) 
5.7 8.9 8.5 9.0 8.5 7.5 6.7 6.1 6.1 7.9
4. Short-term interest rate (level)  3.3 1.5 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 6.3 0.4
5. Nominal effective exchange rate 
(+: depreciation) 
2.7 -14.1 -0.9 -1.2 -1.6 -1.9 -1.9 -1.7 -8.4 -3.3
6. Government net lending (level, % of 
GDP) 
-4.5 -11.2 -13.6 -10.8 -10.1 -10.1 -9.9 -9.6 -2.8  -10.8
7. Current account (level, % of GDP)  -4.6 -3.8 -5.9 -4.7 -4.2 -4.1 -4.2 -4.2 -1.8 -4.4
      
Japan     
1. Real gross domestic product  -0.7 -6.5 -3.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3  2.9 -1.6
2. Deflator of private consumption  1.5 -1.1 -0.8 -1.7 -2.1 -2.3 -2.5 -2.6  2.9 -1.9
3. Unemployment rate (level, % of 
civilian labour force) 
4.1 4.9 6.2 7.1 7.6 8.2 8.7 9.2 2.9 7.4
4. Short-term interest rate (level)  0.9 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 4.4 0.2
5. Nominal effective exchange rate 
(+: depreciation) 
-10.6 -17.4 -5.7 -7.7 -9.6 -9.6 -9.6 -9.5 -9.0 -9.9
6. Government net lending (level, % of 
GDP) 
-5.6 -9.9 -5.0 -3.9 -4.7 -5.6 -6.5 -7.2 -3.1 -6.1
7. Current account (level, % of GDP)  4.0 1.8 -0.3 0.5 0.0 -0.3 -0.9 -1.7  2.1 -0.1
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Table 20. cont'd 
World (US$, GDP weights)     
1. Real GDP  2.8 -3.5 0.7 2.7 2.9 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.7 2.0
2. Real GDP per capita  1.6 -4.6 -0.5 1.5 1.7 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.1 0.8
3. Real exports  3.5 -4.3 1.8 2.5 4.0 4.6 4.7 4.4 5.9 2.5
4. GDP deflator  4.1 -0.1 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 8.9 1.0
5. Price of oil (Brent, US$/bbl)  96.9 46.6 53.8 54.9 55.6 56.1 56.6 57.3 24.0 54.4
6. World population (in billions)  6.7 6.8 6.9 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 5.2 7.0
7. World population (growth rate, in %)  1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.6 1.2
Note: The euro-area nominal short-term interest rate represents the 3-month Euribor rate; the US nominal short-term interest 
rate represents the 3-month Eurodollar (Libor) rate; the Japanese nominal short-term interest rate represents the 3-month 
money-market rate. 
Source: NIME model, Belgian Federal Planning Bureau. 
The projection results indicate that although the model’s potential output growth declines, 
effective output falls off much more sharply in the short term, producing large and relatively 
persistent negative output gaps and leading to sluggish recoveries in all major economic areas. 
The output gaps signal the presence of un- or under-utilised resources in the economy, such as 
idle machinery and non-frictional unemployment. These idle resources have a direct effect on 
the economy’s dynamic equilibrium: rising unemployment reduces firms’ pricing power; this, in 
turn, tends to reduce consumer price inflation, which tends to increase households’ purchasing 
power and consumption, bringing the economy back towards a situation of full employment of 
productive resources. 
The model simulation indicates that the initial 2008–09 downturn leads to a marked decline in 
aggregate final demand, which is accompanied by a decline in the rates of consumer price 
inflation in the euro area and the US. In Japan, the downturn plunges the country back into 
persistent deflation over the period 2009–15. As the recession sets in, it is assumed to bring 
about a fall in potential output, thus limiting the demand for labour and fixed capital investment, 
and raising both the equilibrium and effective rate of unemployment. As the size of the pool of 
the unemployed swells, nominal wage growth only barely manages to outpace inflation, 
bringing about a stagnation in real wages and limiting the growth in households’ real disposable 
income. 
As output decreases in 2009 and 2010, the Taylor rule that is posited for the monetary-policy 
reaction function leads to significant reductions in nominal interest rates, which fall towards 
their zero lower bound. As of 2010, it is also assumed that the normal functioning of financial 
markets is restored and that the unusually large premia raising the cost of credit will disappear. 
The lower rates of consumer price inflation in the major economic areas also produce changes 
in nominal effective exchange rates: those countries that face the lowest inflationary pressures 
see their currency appreciate, at least in nominal effective terms. As the table indicates, the US, 
the euro area and Japan all face falling inflationary pressures and it is thus the residual aggregate 
representing the ‘rest of the world’ that sees its nominal effective exchange rate depreciate.
7 
                                                      
7 The 25 largest countries (or economic areas) that are included in the NIME model’s ‘rest of the world’ 
area are the following, by decreasing size of GDP in US$: PR China (mainland), Canada, Brazil, Russia, 
South Korea, India, Mexico, Australia, Turkey, Switzerland, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Norway,   
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The onset of the current economic and financial crisis has led governments in the US and the 
EU to put in place relatively large, counter-cyclical, discretionary fiscal packages, which come 
as supplementary boosts to the autonomous effects of countries’ automatic fiscal stabilisers. 
These deficit-spending packages have the merit of limiting the scale of the short-term cyclical 
downturn, but appear to be too limited to effectively offset the massive declines in private sector 
demand that are expected in 2009 and 2010. Hence, notwithstanding the expected fall in 
potential output growth, significant negative output gaps are projected up to the end of the 
projection period. These discretionary fiscal stimulus measures and automatic stabilisers will 
nevertheless produce a very significant increase in public deficits and debt. As the downturn 
continues and unemployment rises, public deficits will be raised further by increases in 
entitlements such as unemployment benefits. 
The projection indicates that although the fiscal stabilisation packages will help to limit the 
depth of the worldwide recession, the world economy faces a real risk that the scale of the 
downturn could lead to widespread stagnation in a low-inflation environment. Although only 
Japan is projected to experience continued deflation, the risk of more prevalent and persistent 
deflation would be exacerbated if governments were to scale back public spending while private 
demand remained weak; this situation could surface in the US in 2011 and 2012, when current 
laws and fiscal policies should bring about significant fiscal consolidation. This scenario 
presents governments with a difficult trade-off between attempting to stave off a protracted 
recession through large and sustained fiscal stimulus plans and ensuring fiscal solvency. It is 
also possible that the threat of deflation will lead central banks to implement unconventional 
monetary policies that bring about a rapid return to inflation rates that are more in line with 
long-term inflation targets. The need to resort to further strategies to forestall deflation will 
ultimately depend on the stability of inflation expectations in an economy. These expectations 
are directly linked to the credibility of central banks in achieving their long-term inflation 
objectives (Krugman, 2008). If central banks’ commitments to price stability with positive rates 
of inflation are seen to be weak, this could force monetary authorities to resort to new and 
creative unconventional methods to restore and ensure stable positive inflation (Williams, 
2009). 
Over the first quarter of 2009, major central banks have actively assumed their roles of lenders 
of last resort and market makers of last resort, massively expanding their balance sheets and the 
‘M0’ monetary base. The counterpart of this increase in base money has mostly been a build-up 
of ‘excess reserves’ held by financial institutions with their central bank and has not fuelled 
increased transactions and inflation. Yet here is now a risk not of deflation but of strong future 
inflation if central banks do not reabsorb all excess liquidity quickly enough once transactions 
increase and the economy picks up. 
Even in the face of significantly lower growth of future potential output, a return of effective 
output to potential output levels will most likely require years rather than quarters, as has been 
the case in most of the recent recessions. The current downturn is highly synchronised 
throughout the world economy, and no country seems to be in a position to play the role of 
importer of last resort that the US has played until recently. Indeed, at least since the early 
2000s, world output has been largely underpinned by exceptionally robust and resilient US 
household spending. But now it seems very likely that US households will significantly increase 
their saving rate over the coming years (Godley et al., 2008). If US domestic demand is to 
progress at a less rapid rate over 2009–15 than over recent years, the world economy will have 
                                                                                                                                                            
Argentina, South Africa, Iran, Thailand, Hong Kong PRC, Venezuela, United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, 
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to turn to other sources of final demand growth to pick up the slack that will accompany the 
rebalancing of the US economy. Where might this new source of demand come from? 
Looking at the world’s major current account imbalances over the last years, it appears that the 
main beneficiaries of strong external demand were Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries and 
Asian economies, whose GDP growth was underpinned by exports to the more advanced 
economies of the US and Western Europe. This was the case for both Japan and China, whose 
GDP growth was largely export-driven. If oil-exporting countries and major Asian economies 
were to reorient their economic growth towards greater dependence on components of domestic 
demand, this could boost domestic income levels and help with a smooth unwinding of global 
current account and income/saving imbalances. 
Regarding China in particular, it has long been noted that China suffers from large income 
inequalities between a relatively rich urban population benefiting from export-oriented 
economic activities and a poorer countryside, trailing in income and lacking in social safety nets 
(Huang, 2008). This situation leads to large parts of China’s rural population choosing to limit 
their consumption levels in view of ensuring basic precautionary saving. Even though the 
current relative size of China’s economy would not allow it to ensure the rebalancing of the 
global economy by itself, China could still ensure greater and more widespread domestic 
prosperity while assuming a greater role in world affairs. 
8.3  Lingering uncertainties surrounding the dynamics of output growth 
The resources of nature and men’s devices are just as fertile and 
productive as they were. The rate of our progress towards solving the 
material problems of life is not less rapid. We are as capable as before 
of affording for everyone a high standard of life. ...But today we have 
involved ourselves in a colossal muddle, having blundered in the control 
of a delicate machine, the working of which we do not understand. 
John Maynard Keynes (1936) 
8.3.1  The short-term unknowns 
Risks and uncertainties are now particularly large for short-term GDP growth (i.e. growth over 
the period 2009–10), as is attested by the rapid and continued downward revisions made by 
short-term forecasters for economic growth in the major economic areas of the world economy. 
The uncertainties are manifest as forecasters appear to be adjusting their forecasts with the flow 
of economic data, and seem to be at a loss in determining possible future turning points and the 
effects of the current crisis on future output growth and levels. Table 21 shows how The 
Economist’s monthly “Poll of Forecasters” has evolved since early 2008. The current worldwide 
economic and financial crisis unfolded in August 2007. In the US, the Business Cycle Dating 
Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) declared that the present 
recession began in December 2007. Nevertheless, through October 2008 forecasters were still 
predicting positive annual growth for the US in 2009. Indeed, forecasters were revising their 
forecasts downward only slowly, reacting to the flow of incoming data. 
Short-term forecasts rely on historical data, the most recent of which are highly unreliable: 
paraphrasing former British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis Healey, carrying out short-term 
forecasts on the basis of the incoming data flow has never been more like steering a car while 
looking only into the rear-view mirror. The most recent forecasts are now announcing sharp 
year-on-year average declines in GDP in 2009, but the magnitude of the downturn and the 
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Table 21. The Economist’s “Poll of Forecasters” (real GDP, average of point forecasts)  
 Forecasts  for  2009 
Date of Release  Euro area US
10 January 2008  2.0 2.6
7 February 2008  1.9 2.5
6 March 2008  1.8 2.2
3 April 2008  1.6 1.7
8 May 2008  1.5 1.7
5 June 2008  1.5 1.5
3 July 2008  1.3 1.3
7 August 2008  1.2 1.2
4 September 2008  0.9 1.3
3 October 2008  0.6 0.6
6 November 2008  -0.1 -0.2
4 December 2008  -0.9 -1.0
8 January 2009  -1.4 -1.2
5 February 2009  -2.1 -2.0
5 March 2009  -2.4 -2.2
2 April 2009  -3.4 -2.7
Source: The Economist. 
The main unknowns that weigh on and obscure current short-term economic forecasts pertain to 
such considerations as the size and duration of the downturn that the global economy has 
already undergone since the summer of 2007. This opens up a number of upside uncertainties 
surrounding  
•  the possible re-emergence of pent-up demand and upswings in both consumer and 
investor sentiment that could rapidly materialise and produce an upswing in economic 
activity;  
•  the short-term support to real incomes and final demand that could spring from the recent 
sharp reductions in energy and other commodity prices for net importers of these 
products;  
•  the rapid emergence of a significant upturn in activity based on the large fiscal stimulus 
packages that have been put in place in many areas of the world economy; and finally, 
•  the emergence of a floor under bank losses and write-downs, leading to clean bank 
balance sheets, renewed confidence in financial markets and an increase in the flow of 
credit to currently liquidity-constrained households and non-financial corporations.  
On the downside, however, one could also point to uncertainties linked to continued downward 
pressure on US house prices, increasing difficulties in commercial real estate, and lingering 
confusion over unresolved liquidity and solvency issues in major financial sectors of the world 
economy. FISCAL STABILISATION PLANS AND THE OUTLOOK FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY | 41 
8.3.2  The long-term unknowns 
Much of today’s discussion on economic projections and forecasts focuses on what can be 
expected in terms of the future behaviour of real GDP growth and potential output growth. 
Many forecasting or projection methods assume that shocks lead to only temporary deviations 
from long-term ‘equilibrium’ values, with economic aggregates converging towards levels or 
growth rates on their long-term path. Given the magnitude and the worldwide synchronised 
scope of the economic and financial downturn, it has sometimes been suggested that the current 
headwinds could permanently alter long-term GDP growth. Thus, even assuming that real GDP 
will converge towards a trend or potential level, this level of future, potential real output might 
not coincide with the mappings that existed before the outbreak of the present economic and 
financial crisis. 
Figure 4 presents four scenarios regarding how this might play out: 
1)  The trend output level could remain unchanged, inasmuch as it is determined only by 
demographic changes and changes in productivity, which could be insensitive to 
transitory changes in effective output and relative prices (Trend GDP_0). 
2)  The trend output level could fall initially owing to the crisis and then return to its previous 
trend growth rate, implying a permanent loss in output relative to pre-crisis trend output 
levels (Trend GDP_1). 
3)  The trend output level could fall owing to the crisis and then embark upon a new, lower 
trend growth rate, implying a larger permanent loss in output relative to pre-crisis trend 
output levels (Trend GDP_2). 
4)  The trend output level could initially fall owing to the crisis and then embark upon a new, 
higher trend growth rate, implying a long-term permanent gain in output relative to pre-
crisis trend output levels (Trend GDP_3). 
Figure 4. Potential real GDP: A shift to a new and uncertain trend? 
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A first comment is that potential or ‘equilibrium’ output is not a directly observable aggregate. 
Potential output is primarily a theoretical concept and the question remains as to whether it 
corresponds to any existing phenomenon. As potential output is not observable, it is often 
substituted – and confused – with a measure of ‘trend’ output that is generated by ‘fitting’, 
usually linearly, a data series of historical real GDP. Hence, an often-used but still ad hoc 
procedure for fleshing out the concept of potential output is generating a proximate series for it 
using statistical time series approaches (Koske and Pain, 2008; European Central Bank, 2000) 
without explicitly linking this derived measure to any formal theoretical framework. 
There are also alternative methods for computing an economy’s potential output level, based on 
more specific theoretical frameworks and their associated production functions. Indeed, the 
views as to the evolution of potential output are directly linked to the general representation one 
has of the functioning of the economy. In the classical world of RBC models, where output is 
fixed at the full employment output level, an economy’s potential output is naturally viewed to 
be equal to effective output. In the New Keynesian DSGE world of sticky prices and wages and 
imperfect competition, a country’s potential output level can deviate from its effective output 
level in the short term, returning to it in a theoretically-defined ‘long run’. Furthermore, 
potential output can itself lie below what is defined as the economy’s natural output level, which 
is the level of output consistent with perfect competition and fully flexible prices. 
In the neoclassical synthesis models, potential output is based on the choice of a functional form 
for the production technology, which then serves to provide estimates of equilibrium demand 
for inputs such as capital services and labour. Other ‘deep’ parameters such as labour 
productivity, the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (or NAIRU) and natural rate 
of inflation are usually estimated using statistical filtering techniques such as the Hodrick-
Prescott (univariate) or Kalman filters (multivariate). 
Since the early 1980s, the standard view has been that the unit-root null hypothesis could not be 
rejected by statistical tests on US GNP data (Nelson and Plosser, 1982) and that a series’ trend 
function was itself durably affected by shocks (i.e. the presence of stochastic trends). Since then, 
these results have been challenged as they appear to be biased by structural breaks and because 
the power of the standard ADF tests they rely on is now considered low. Recent time series 
analyses of US data do provide some interesting results concerning the long-term properties of 
real GDP data. Very long-term, historical real GDP data for the US, covering the period 1867–
2008, has been shown to closely follow a stationary trend expansion. Indeed, the (natural) 
logarithm of real GDP has been estimated to follow a linear trend such that the usual statistical 
tests either reject the hypothesis of the presence of a unit root or fail to reject the hypothesis of 
trend stationarity, at conventional confidence levels (Chinn, 2009; Cheung and Chinn, 1996). 
Over the long run, the log of US real GDP exhibits a clear behaviour of reversion to trend. Even 
major real shocks such as the Great Depression do not appear to have modified the long-term 
trend-stationarity property of this series. Results also suggest that the original real GDP series 
follows an exponential trend and that the first difference of the log of real US GDP (i.e. the 
growth rate of real GDP) follows a stationary process. 
Based on US results and further international evidence (Hegwood and Papell, 2007; Alba and 
Papell, 2006; Fleissig and Strauss, 2002), it appears reasonable to assume that the long-term, 
historical real GDP of other major market economies such as the euro area, the UK and Japan 
do not follow unit root processes. Historical evidence suggests that even though the current 
shocks from the worldwide economic and financial crisis may lead to more or less persistent 
deviations of real GDP from its long-term equilibrium or trend values, GDP will eventually 
return to its trend level and growth rate (Haugh et al., 2009). 
 FISCAL STABILISATION PLANS AND THE OUTLOOK FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY | 43 
The long-term behaviour of a country’s GDP series is of considerable importance for economic 
policy prescriptions. If economic processes are seen to be trend stationary, economic policy 
decision-makers know that the economy will eventually return to its trend level even without 
discretionary policy measures. Only the rate of a shock’s decay is uncertain. Policy is then 
reduced to a question of optimal stabilisation, for instance in terms of minimising output losses 
and unemployment (i.e. minimising an aggregate welfare-loss function) stemming from the 
cyclical component of output. Furthermore, policy can also be framed in such a way that 
concerns as to the long-term, such as long-term productivity growth and fiscal solvency issues, 
are also addressed. 
If economic processes are difference stationary, however (and have only a stochastic trend), 
random shocks have permanent effects on future output levels and there is no return to any 
meaningful deterministic trend. In this case, economic stabilisation policy loses all of its 
relevance and economic policy can no longer be geared towards stabilisation. Here, policy 
should be implemented in view of attaining policy-makers’ specific objectives (e.g. specific 
rates of long-term output growth and unemployment) totally irrespective of the occurrence of 
short-term exogenous shocks. Policy thus becomes structural, focusing on the long-term instead 
of aiming at short-term stabilisation around an inexistent solid trend. 
The NIME model, like many modern macroeconometric models, builds on the unrejected 
hypothesis (or the assumption) that major economic aggregates such as real GDP can be 
modelled as (trend) stationary processes. This means that there are cointegrating vectors such 
that the behaviour of these economic aggregates can be modelled in the form of behavioural 
equations containing error correction terms that lead the aggregates to converge towards a trend 
(level or growth rate). Conversely, this implies that these economic relationships are not 
modelled as unit root processes and do not possess random walk components. Even if most 
modern macroeconometric models function with behavioural equations that are built and 
estimated along the lines of long-term cointegration principles, the computation of core 
equilibrium (trend) variables is often still largely based on the use of ad hoc statistical filters, 
which usually allow for some degree of covariance between the source data and the filtered 
data. Hence, a cyclical downturn in real GDP data will show up as a decline in measured 
potential output. 
Even when models exhibit mean-reversion properties, the exact speed of adjustment to shocks is 
still very much an empirical question. The insights that can be gained from the half-lives of 
AR(1) regression coefficients do not necessarily reflect the ‘true’ convergence speeds that will 
ultimately be observed in the context of the current highly synchronised worldwide economic 
and financial crisis. Thus, establishing the existence of a trend-stationary process does not go 
very far in providing for the exact dynamics of the return to trend that can be expected in the 
present economic downturn: Will the convergence process materialise in the form of a quick V-
shaped rebound or a longer U-shaped rebound? Will it come with a double-dip W-shaped 
rebound or follow a much more protracted L-shaped path to recovery? Will the rebound come 
with growth rates that are well above trend growth rates, leading to an initial “overshooting” of 
the trend level or will the convergence be smooth and from below (Morley, 2009)? 
Figure 5 suggests two possible paths for a return to trend (in levels) for real GDP. In a first case 
(GDP_1), the economy’s level of real GDP initially falls below a trend level and then gradually 
returns to the trend output level without overshoot; during the convergence period, real GDP 
growth rates exceed trend growth rates. 
In a second case (GDP_2), the economy’s level of real GDP falls below a trend level, then 
returns to the trend output level with an overshoot; during the convergence period, real GDP 
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potential level of output, effective growth rates begin to fall back to the trend growth rates. After 
an overshoot, the decline in growth rates brings effective output into line with potential output. 
Figure 5. Real GDP growth after a shock: What path for a reversion to trend? 
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Recent studies of the effects of financial crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008a and 2008b) indicate 
that severe financial crises have historically led to sharp declines in real per capita GDP, which 
falls by 9.3% from pre-crisis peak to crisis trough. After the outbreak of the crisis, real per 
capita GDP requires about 1.9 years (i.e. 23 months) to return to trend levels. Still, these results 
are average results for both developed and emerging market economies and are based on data 
reaching as far back as the Norwegian financial crisis of 1899. The declines in real GDP are 
usually significantly smaller for developed economies than for emerging market economies, 
most likely owing to sudden sharp disruptions in capital flows. 
The long-term trends of econometric models, when based on the Hodrick-Prescott filter (which 
has been shown to suffer from ‘end-sample bias’) and applied to historical data only, could lead 
to an overestimation of future, potential output levels. Conversely, the Hodrick-Prescott filter, 
when applied to historical data extended by short-term forecasts, could lead to an 
underestimation of future, potential output levels. This would then lead to a failure to recognise 
that the current downturn is most likely temporary, even if it proves to be particularly 
protracted. 
8.3.3  What do uncertainties about past GDP growth rates portend for current 
macroeconomic forecasts? 
The uncertainties we have regarding future rates of economic growth can also be entertained 
concerning past economic performance. Indeed, as the current financial crisis and seizing up of 
the financial sector leads to massive write-downs and expected write-downs, discussion has 
reopened concerning measurement issues regarding the contribution of the financial sector to a 
country’s GDP. These discussions are not merely interesting from a statistical or accounting 
standpoint, but also for their implications in terms of economic policy and of what we can 
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The measurement of the manufacturing industry’s contribution to GDP involves a relatively 
simple determination of the market value of its real output and of intermediate consumption. 
Matters are much less clear when one attempts to measure the value added by services, in 
particular of financial and business services, where one must disentangle the real and price 
components of both explicit and implicit service charges. Conventional methodologies that are 
used to draw up US national accounts base the measure of the GDP contribution of financial 
services at least in part on indices of transactions. This implies that a significant share of the 
measured GDP contribution of financial services is directly linked to the number of cheques that 
are cleared and to the number of transactions that are conducted at ATM machines (Moulton, 
2000). These difficulties in the appraisal of the ‘true’ contribution of the financial services 
industry to a country’s real GDP have led to renewed speculation that the resurgence in 
productivity growth in the US over the period 1995–2005 was in fact partly owing to a 
statistical artefact. 
Recent research suggests that a large part of the apparent gap in real GDP growth between the 
US and other industrialised countries has stemmed from high multifactor productivity growth in 
US financial and business services (van Ark et al., 2008). Yet, attempts at correcting the official 
measures of value added by US financial services lead to the conclusion that ‘usable 
productivity growth’ was probably no higher than that observed in other major industrialised 
economic areas of the world. Indeed, adjusting for capital consumption, for the effects of 
changes in consumer prices on real output and for the current account deficit, usable 
productivity growth in the US has been shown to have been lower by 0.4 percentage points than 
the average rate of productivity growth of other OECD countries over the period 1995–2005 
(Baker and Rosnick, 2007). 
The implications of the difficulty in correctly appraising the value added contribution of 
financial and business services are large in terms of the conclusions they could lead to as 
regards macroeconomic projections. Current and future forecasts for such crucial indicators as 
output gaps are based on measures of past real GDP. It has always been acknowledged that the 
evaluation of the present level of real GDP – or of its growth rate – is surrounded by relatively 
large uncertainties, showing up in revisions to the historical data that are made over the 
following quarters and years. Even so, the growing weight of the services sector in modern 
economies and the difficulty in measuring its true contribution to overall GDP add to the 
complexity of estimating contemporaneous output. 
One characteristic of the world projections presented above is that major economic areas appear 
to face significant risks of falling into low, and even deflationary, growth trends as of the last 
quarters of 2009. This is the direct consequence of the relatively large and persistent real output 
gap projections, which themselves stem from the assumptions that underlie the model’s 
estimates of potential output. But could it be that these levels of potential output have been 
systematically overestimated over the past years? If this were indeed the case, major economies 
such as the US and the euro area would have been operating with lower, ‘true’ potential output 
levels and with ‘true’ output gaps that were both more frequently positive and more greatly 
positive than has been realised until now. As illustrated in Figure 6, this would imply that the 
projected declines in effective real output would push the future levels of real GDP less further 
down below the true potential output levels than what is currently expected, meaning that the 
risks of deflation could well be overstated. At the same time, this comforting news regarding 
deflation prospects would bode ill for the prospects of future employment and long-term real 
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Figure 6. Effective real GDP and potential real GDP levels: What will the true scale of output 
gaps turn out to be? 
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8.4  Final notes of caution with respect to forecasts and projections 
One should view these projection results with due circumspection. Indeed, model results are 
generally fraught with risk and uncertainty, covering both the known and the unknown 
unknowns. 
In this projection, significant uncertainty can be expected to reside in 
1)  the future ‘true’ response of interest rates to the demand-pull component of inflation, 
linked to the fiscal stimulus plans; 
2)  the future ‘true’ cost-push inflation that will materialise in relation to the future ‘true’ 
potential output level; 
3)  the future effective reactions of world interest rates and exchange rates to a rapid and 
worldwide increase in public deficits and debt; and 
4)  the future ‘true’ path of world real oil prices. 
Indeed, the model results could overestimate the positive short-term effects of the fiscal 
stimulus measures. Inflation could turn out to be lower than suggested by the simulation owing 
to the present recessionary context, characterised by the lack of consumer willingness to spend 
and the more general lack of ‘animal spirits’ that would otherwise raise private sector demand 
for loanable funds and raise nominal interest rates. 
On the other hand, the results could also understate future inflationary pressures as the current 
recession reduces private sector investment and could produce accelerated capital depreciation 
through ‘use, decay and obsolescence’. Low or even negative net investment could temporarily 
lower potential output levels, as evaluated by standard filtering techniques, and heighten the 
inflationary effects of the fiscal stabilisation packages. 
The projection could significantly overstate the real output effects of the stimulus packages 
inasmuch as their potential to increase real output could be constrained by sharp increases in 
interest rates, widespread currency realignments and heightened volatility of capital flows 
linked to significantly higher risk premia on government debt associated with fears about long-FISCAL STABILISATION PLANS AND THE OUTLOOK FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY | 47 
term sovereign insolvency. These fears could be all the more justified since major central banks 
have recently begun to play quasi-fiscal roles in the financing of government purchases of 
impaired and toxic financial assets and have turned to the monetisation of newly issued 
government debts. 
Finally, recent studies suggest that the current recession was not only precipitated by the 
outbreak of the financial crisis in August 2007, but that the rise in world oil prices over the 
period 2002–08 also had a major role in initiating the downturn (Hamilton, 2009). World oil 
prices are usually thought to change in order to balance worldwide supply and demand. Growth 
in world demand for oil has now fallen, in line with the widespread decline in real output. The 
accompanying fall in oil prices has certainly already provided some relief in the form of 
increased household purchasing power. This world projection assumes that oil prices will 
remain constant in real terms over the period 2010–15. A decline oil demand and supply, 
however, could lead to major delays in investment projects linked to new oil extraction and 
refining, which could drive up world oil prices above those assumed in the projection. 
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